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I.

THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE

Placing important decisions in the hands of the civil jury
made
up of ordinary citizens untrained in the law - has long been criticized.
For example, Erwin Griswold, law school dean and Solicitor General
of the United States, asked, "Why should anyone think that 12 persons
brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack of
-
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general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding contro
versies between persons?"1 And Jerome Frank, law professor, aggres
sive legal realist, and judge, argued that juries are uncertain, capri
cious, and unpredictable, ignorant and prejudiced, poor factfinders,
gullible, and incapable of following complex legal rules,2 thus making
"the orderly administration of justice virtually impossible."3 The great
weakness of even the most thoughtful of these criticisms is that they
are based on little more than anecdote4 and assertion, rather than any
thing resembling systematic empirical evidence.
The first major study of jury decisionmaking was designed with the
awareness that any assessment of the jury ultimately had to be made
in comparison with judges, the decisionmakers who would replace the
jury in any cases juries would not be permitted to decide.5 Accord
ingly, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel asked judges in 8,000 civil and
criminal cases sampled from around the United States how they would
have decided each case if it were a bench trial instead of a jury trial. 6
By comparing these responses to the actual jury verdicts, Kalven and
Zeise! found that judges and juries agreed on the verdict in personal
injury cases 79% of the time.7 They also found that when jurors and
judges disagreed, the jury was no more inclined than the judge to favor
plaintiffs over defendants,8 that the agreement-disagreement ratios
remained the same for both easy and difficult cases (suggesting no lack

1. 1962-1963 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN'S REPORT
KAI.VEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966).

5-6,

quoted in HARRY

2

See JEROME FRANK LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 183-99

3.

Id. at 195; see also JEROME FRANK COURTS ON TRIAL 111-25 (1949).

1963).

,

(6th ed., Anchor Books

,

4. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System -And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (1992) ("The trouble

with legislation by anecdote is not just that some of them are false or misleading. Even if
true and accurate, anecdotes contribute little to developing a meaningful picture of the situa
tion about which we are concerned. . .. The proportion of cases that results in one or the
other error, and the ratio of one kind of error to the other, ought to be of greater interest to
serious policy-makers than a handful of anecdotes on either side of the issue."); Marc
Galanter et al., How to Improve Civil Justice Policy, 77 JUDICATURE 185, 185 (1994) ("Im
proving the civil justice system requires thoughtful, objective analysis based on sound em
pirical data. The lack of systematic, cumulative data in this area makes it possible for far
reaching policy proposals to be advanced on the basis of tendentious anecdotes and num
bers. A bias in which solutions to perceived problems are developed by reference to unusual
and atypical cases goes unchallenged. Not surprisingly, the effects of the resulting policies
are often unanticipated."), quoted in Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Pro
file ofthe Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 234 (1996).
5. See generally Harry Kalven, Jr.,
1055-56, 1056 n.3 (1964).
6.

See id. at 1063.

7.

See id. at 1065.

8.

See id.

The Dignity ofthe Civil Jury, 50 VA. L.

REV. 1055,
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of comprehension by the juries),9 and that the judges rarely thought
the juries' verdicts were unreasonable in light of the available evi
dence and applicable law.10 In fact, the only noteworthy difference
was that when juries did find liability, they awarded on average 20%
more than judges said they would have awarded.11 Even that, how
ever, was a more modest difference than critics of the jury would have
had us believe. Perhaps because Kalven and Zeisel's research findings
provided so little support to the usual criticisms, the critics fell silent
for a generation.
But by the mid-1980s, criticism of the civil jury returned with vigor,
part of a more wide-ranging attack on the civil justice system (in par
ticular, the tort system).12 "One of the most criticized aspects of jury
behavior" has been juries' awards of general damages, also known as
noneconomic damages or by the synecdoche "pain and suffering"
awards.13 Unlike special or "economic" damages, the jury receives lit
tle guidance regarding what a correct general damages award might
be. And, unlike punitive damages, which are similarly lacking in guid
ance but which are rarely awarded in accident cases, general damages
are proper in every personal injury case in which awards are made.
9. See id. at 1066.
10. See id. at 1067.
11. See id. at 1065.
12. In general these attacks were no more grounded in empirical research than earlier
assaults. Where data were mentioned, their interpretation often was rather careless. For
extensive discussions and evaluations of that body of "evidence," see STEPHEN DANIELS &
JOANNE MARTIN, CIVILJURIES ANO THE POLmCS OF REFORM (1995); Marc Galanter, Jury
Shadows: Reflections on the Civil Jury and the "Litigation Explosion," in THE AMERICAN
CIVILJURY: FINAL REPORT OF THE 1986 CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON
.ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1987); Robert E. Litan, Introduction, in VERDICT:
AsSESSING THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Robert J. MacCoun, Inside
the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Peter H.
Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM 306 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP
POCKETS ANO OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995); Stephen Daniels, The Question of
Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda
Building, LAW & CONTEMP PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269, 292-308; Marc Galanter, The
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Marc Galanter, News from
Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U. L. REV. 77 (1993); Marc
Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Saks,
supra note 4; and Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 Aruz. L. REV. 849 (1998).
.

13. Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About
Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1224 (1994); see also Oscar
G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763,
768-69 (1995) (asserting unexplainable variation among awards of pain and suffering in
wrongful death cases); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for
Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VANO. L. REV. 1365, 1369-70 (1989) (asserting
unjustified variation in awards for comparable injuries caused by medical malpractice and
other tortious acts).
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Moreover, general damages constitute about fifty-five to sixty percent
of personal injury damages awards.14 It is no surprise, then, that gen
eral damages have been at the center of contemporary debates on ju
ries and the civil justice system.
The critics of the civil jury assert that awards generally are unreli
able, capricious, and "out of control."15 More specifically, general
damages are alleged to be both excessive and influenced by inappro
priate considerations, such as sympathy for the victims and the defen
dant's apparent ability to pay.16 By implication then, jury decisions
about general damages are thought to be insufficiently responsive to
proper considerations, namely, the nature of the injury and its impact
on the plaintiff's life. Moreover, implicit in these allegations is a
problem that Jerome Frank had made explicit: that jurors do not
think about cases the same way judges and lawyers do.
Although research has begun to focus on damages, these studies
have thus far left the basic issues underlying the criticisms of jury
awards largely unanswered.17 These basic issues are how jurors per
ceive injuries and translate those perceptions into dollar awards, and
whether jurors' decisionmaking processes differ fundamentally from
those of judges (and lawyers).18 The research reported in this Article
investigates jurors' perceptions of injury seriousness and awards of
general damages, and, like Kalven and Zeisel, compares them to
judges' and lawyers' responses to the same injuries. The results of this
most basic comparison have significant implications for criticisms of
jury awards and for legal policy concerning jury trials.19

14. See Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Ad
justments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 296 (1998).
12.

15.
16.

See criticisms reviewed in works at supra note

12.

Documentation of the various allegations can be found in the works cited supra note

17.

Much of the empirical research literature on compensatory damages is discussed in
our review of the relevant literature, infra, Section II.B.

18.

Despite the well known research strategy of Kalven & Zeisel, only a few studies
have directly compared the performance of jurors to judges. See Edmund S. Howe &
Thomas C. Loftus, Integration ofIntention and Outcome Information by Students and Circuit
Court Judges: Design Economy and Individual Differences,
J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL.
Stephen Landsman & Richard Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of
Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, BEHAv. SCI. & L.
Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability
Enough?,
J. PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL.
None of these addressed, however, the
question of damages. Another study contains a partial comparison (6 judges in a group
composed mostly of lawyers). See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Non

22

102 (1992);

113 (1994);
62

12

739 (1992).

economic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison ofJurors with Legal Pro
fessionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883 (1993). All of these studies found no differences in deci
sionmaking between judges and jurors.

19. A more detailed explication of the research questions is presented infra Section
ill.A, and a more detailed discussion of the policy inlplications of the findings appears infra
Section V.D.

756

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:751

To provide the context for our research, Part II of this Article
briefly summarizes relevant aspects of the law and the empirical re
search literature. The law governing general damages offers no real
guidance to jurors or anyone else called upon to award damages at
trial.
Empirical research shows that jurors display a substantial
amount of sensitivity to the relative seriousness of injuries (vertical
equity) in awarding general damages, but also a considerable amount
of variation within levels of severity (horizontal inequity). This body
of research, however, has some conceptual and methodological weak
nesses; thus, important empirical questions remain.
Part III describes the research methods and design of our study. In
brief, we sampled hundreds of jurors, judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and
defense lawyers from urban and rural regions of two different states.
Through telephone interviews, we presented dozens of different inju
ries (two per interviewee) to the respondents and had them evaluate
the seriousness of the injuries and specify what general damages
award seemed appropriate for the injury suffered.
We used the survey responses to develop predictive (and arguably,
explanatory) models of the decisionmaking of each group. We then
used these statistical models to determine for each group which attrib
utes of the injuries had what degree of impact on severity judgments
and on awards, as well as how differences in the decisionmakers' geog
raphy, demography, and experiences affected their decisions. Part IV
presents the results of these analyses. In short, the models evidence a
remarkable degree of similarity among all groups of decisionmakers,
plus a high degree of predictability, in regard to their judgments of
injury severity. As to the translation of injury perceptions into mone
tary awards, however, more differences among the groups appeared,
and the predictive power of the models declined.
Part V presents our conclusions with respect to both the empirical
findings and their policy implications. Taken together, the findings
suggest that the differences between jurors' awards and those of the
other groups do not reflect fundamental differences in decisionmak
ing, but rather a loss of consistency in translating perceptions of se
verity into damages awards. That loss of consistency likely can be at
tributed to the fact that in assessing the value of a single case, jurors
lack the frame of reference created by other cases that is readily avail
able to judges and lawyers. If that diagnosis is correct, it suggests that
some rather modest changes in procedure are likely to be sufficient to
enable jurors' general damages awards to closely approximate those of
judges in stability and predictability.

II.
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GENERALDAMAGES: THE LAW AND THE
EMPIRICAL REsEARCH
A.

The Law of General Damages

In tort cases, general damages are awarded to compensate plain
tiffs for physical pain, mental suffering, disability, disfigurement, loss
of enjoyment of life, and other similar harms.20 While these "none
conomic" damages may not be inherently different from "economic"
damages such as lost earnings and medical expenses, markets exist to
supply the values of the latter but not the former.21 If art can acquire a
market value, in principle, so can the loss of sight. The problem is that
people do not normally buy and sell the sorts of sensory, motor, cogni
tive, and other capacities that are injured in accidents. The result is
that to compensate for noneconomic losses, the law must tum to an
alternative source of values, namely, the social judgment of the com
munity, typically supplied by juries. A task that involves assigning a
value to the virtually undefinable is, by definition, challenging to per
form and at least as challenging to evaluate. "One of the most difficult
decisions facing the jury in a personal injury case is the size of the
monetary award for pain and suffering, since there is no objective
method of evaluating such damages."22
The law itself provides essentially no guidance to jurors in reaching
a "correct" general damages award. For instance, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts notes that "[t]he discretion of the judge or jury de
termines the amount of recovery, the only standard being such an
amount as a reasonable person would estimate as fair compensa
tion. "23 In addition, the law requires that damages be particularized to
both the details of the objective injury and its subjective effect on the

20. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1979); 22 AM
Damages § 28 (1988).

.

JUR.

2D

21. See Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes ofAge:
NW. U. L. REV. 876, 896-900 (1989); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and

Will the System Survive?, 83
Suffering in Product Liability
Cases: Systematic Compensation or: Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203
(1988).
22. AM JUR. 2D Damages § 260 (1988); see also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury
and Negligence: The View from the Trenches, 28 GA. L. REV. 1, 97-98 (1993) (summarizing a
.

survey of Georgia plaintiffs' and defense lawyers which found that they thought the most
troublesome issue for the jury is a lack of guidance on how to assess damages, especially for
pain and suffering); Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury
Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE LJ. 217 (1993).

23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (1979).

·
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individual victim.24 By implication, then, the law expects awards to re
flect considerable variability.25
Of course, the law has as little guidance to offer judges and lawyers
in this pursuit as it does to juries. Nonetheless, critics of juries seem to
believe that judges and lawyers somehow acquire judgmental capabili
ties that juries lack, producing judgments which are somehow more
"accurate," or at least more consistent, than those provided by jurors.
B.

Empirical Research on Damages Awards

Researchers have sought to identify the determinants of damages
awards. In archival studies, researchers have found that from half to
almost three-fourths of the variation in awards actually made by juries
(and sometimes by judges) can be accounted for by various measures
of injury severity, such as medical expenses or ratings of severity and
duration, as well as by other predictors.26 The measures of injury type,
severity, and permanence are consistently the strongest predictors of
awards, with injuries of greater severity and duration tending to re
ceive more compensation than less severe and more temporary inju
ries. Similarly, simulation studies, which examine mock jurors' awards
in response to experimentally manipulated cases, also find the size of
the award to correspond to the severity of the injury.27
Despite these substantial predictive relationships, the findings sug
gest there are both random and systematic errors in awards. The same
24. See generally David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering
Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 265 (1989).
25. Nevertheless, many trial participants and commentators wish for less variability and
more predictability than the law thus far has been able to design.
26. See AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS:
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRlALs (1985); MARK A. PETERSON, COMPENSATION
FOR INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY (1984); David Baldus et al., Im·

proving Judicial Oversight ofJury Damage Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative
Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80
IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1995); Randall Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and
Other Injuries Created Equal?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 5 (hereinafter
Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice]; Randall R Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in
Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989) [hereinafter Bovbjerg
et al., Valuing Life and Limb]; Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical
Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC Y REV. 997 (1990); Vis
cusi, supra note 21.
'

27. See Jane Goodman et al., Runaway Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations: Mock J11ror Strategies in Awarding Damages, 29 JURIMETRICS 285, 289 (1989); Valerie Hans & M.
David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 151 (1989); Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21
LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 243 (1997); Vidmar & Rice, supra note 18; Roselle L. Wissler et al.,
Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards: the Role ofInjury Characteristics and Fault Attri
butions, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181 (1997). But see Corinne Cather et al., Plaintiff Inj11ry
and Defendant Reprehensibility: Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage
Awards, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189 (1996) (finding no difference in awards as a function
of injury severity).
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studies that find high correlations between injury severity and awards
(termed "vertical equity") also report considerable variation in the
amounts awarded for injuries at the same level of severity (referred to
as "horizontal inequity"),28 which suggests the presence of a good deal
of random error.29
Systematic error in awards is seen in a number of studies which
have found that, despite general vertical equity, plaintiffs with small
losses tend to be overcompensated and those with large losses tend to
be undercompensated.30 Moreover, several factors which should not
have an effect on general damages awards, such as type of defendant
(e.g., individual versus corporation) or type of case (e.g., auto crash
versus medical malpractice)31 nevertheless seem to systematically in
fluence the size of awards.32 In addition, some evidence suggests that
where jurors reside influences their awards - that jurors in urban ar
eas generally make larger awards than those in rural areas,33 and that
28. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 26; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 26; Viscusi, supra
note 21.
29. In simulation studies, for instance, mock jurors are presented with identical case
facts, yet the jurors produce an array of different awards, not one single award. See sources
cited supra note 27. Of course, a complete absence of variability among a group of deci
sionmakers seldom occurs. For a glimpse of the variability of other decisionmakers, see in
fra Table 5. Accordingly, commentators who lament "horizontal inequity" cannot be sug
gesting that its existence demonstrates a defect in the system of damages. What they really
ought to be arguing that the amount of horizontal variability is greater than they believe it
should be.

is

30. See ALFRED F. CON ARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS:
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION at 248-52 (1964); ELIZABETH M.
KING & JAMES P. SMITH, ECONOMIC LOSS AND COMPENSATION IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS
at 74-76 (1988).
31. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 26; PETERSON, supra note 26; Baldus et al., supra
note 26; Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice, supra note 26; Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and
Limb, supra note 26; James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 751 (1985); Viscusi, supra note 21; David C. Baldus et al., Children's Models
for Compensatory Damages (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
32. Simulation studies, however, have added important qualifications and refinements
to conclusions about the way in which these factors affect awards. Most importantly, they
have found that differences in compensatory awards previously attributed to a "deep
pocket" effect are not the result of differences in the defendants' wealth. See Robert J.
MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the
"Deep-Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC'YREV. 121 (1996); Neil Vidmar, et al, Damage

Awards and Jurors' Responsibility Ascriptions in Medical Versus Automobile Negligence
Cases, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 149 (1994); Vidmar, supra note 22; William D. Woody et al.,

Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation Necessary? (1998) (un
published manuscript, on file with the authors) (presented at the biennial meeting of the
American Psychology-Law Society, Redondo Beach, Cal., 1998). Instead, the differences in
awards are due to differences in perceptions of the defendants' intentionality, responsibility,
recklessness, or competence to avoid the injury. See Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to
Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 177;
Hans & Ermann, supra note 27; see also Goodman, et al., supra note 27; MacCoun, supra
note 12; Vidmar et al., supra note 14.

33. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBLICPOLICY74-75 (1985).
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jurors in some states characteristically make smaller or larger awards
than those in other states.34 Thus, awards may depend on more than
the characteristics of injuries and their sequelae.
For answering questions of how jurors respond to the attributes of
the injuries in making their general damages awards, the archival
studies are insufficient in one or more ways. Typically, most jury
awards are reported as single aggregate awards, instead of being sepa
rated into their component parts. Thus, researchers generally use the
total, undifferentiated award, not the specific general damages com
ponent.35 And efforts by some researchers to disaggregate the awards
after the fact36 tend to produce erroneous estimates of the general
component.37
Additionally, the degree of horizontal inequity suggested by many
of the studies may reflect the limitations of the measurements used as
much as any random error in jurors' decisions. For example, the se
verity of injuries usually has been measured by grading a vast array of
injuries on a scale of no more than eight or nine points.38 Each point
on such a scale necessarily captures a range of injuries having different
degrees of severity.39 That jurors would rate the injuries more finely,
and award different amounts to injuries that researchers have treated
as identical, is hardly a failing of juror decisionmaking.
Further, these scales are unidimensional measures, though injuries,
like most social objects and events, occupy a multidimensional space.
For example, on the National Association of Insurance Commission
ers' ("NAIC") Severity of Injury Scale, bums, surgical material left in
a patient, drug side effects, and brain damage all are scored as Level 4
injuries. The Procrustean compression by researchers into a single
dimension of what the decisionmakers almost certainly saw as a multi
dimensional injury squanders explanatory potential.40 Evidence of this

34.

See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 12.

See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 26; PETERSON, supra
Juries and Justice, supra note 26; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 26.
35.

36.

note 26; Bovbjerg et al.,

See Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb, supra note 26; Viscusi, supra note 21.

37.

See Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict Statis
tics: Cautions About the Lorelei's Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599 (1994); Vidmar et al.,
supra note 14.
38. Some researchers use the Severity of Injury Scale developed by the National Asso
ciation of Insurance Commissioners, see NAIC MALPRACTICE CLAIMS:
FINAL
COMPILATION {1980), which ranges from one (emotional injury only) to nine {death). See
DANZON, supra note 33; Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice, supra note 26.
39. See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, in
REFORMING THE C!vIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 339, 354 {Larry Kramer ed., 1996); Gary T.
Schwartz, Proposals for Reforming Pain and Suffering Awards, in REFORMING THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 416, 419 {Larry Kramer ed., 1996)
40. See Allen J. Hart et al., Multidimensional Perceptions of Illness and Injury, 2
CURRENT REs. Soc. PSYCHOL. 30 (Sept. 11, 1997) <http://www.uiowa.edu/-grpproc/crisp/
crisp.html>; Andrew J. Slain et al., Multidimensional Perceptions of Injury: Implications for
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problem is provided by data from simulation jurors, whose assess
ments of injuries on four dimensions (disability, mental suffering, dis
figurement, pain) better predicted their general damages awards (ac
counting for 74% of the variance) than did a single predictor based on
the same jurors' assessments of the overall severity of injury (61% of
the variance in awards), which in turn was a better predictor than the
NAIC scale (44%).41
In addition to poor measurement of injuries, the studies finding
substantial horizontal inequity also fail to take into account legally
relevant differences among injury victims.42 For example, the exact
same permanent loss of hearing should produce a larger general dam
ages award for a musician than for a novelist. Moreover, a permanent
injury should result in a larger award to compensate a 20-year-old
plaintiff for 60 years of future pain and suffering than to compensate a
60-year-old plaintiff for 20 years.43 All of these are examples of verti
cal equity mistaken for horizontal inequity.
Of course, to demonstrate that horizontal inequity has been over
estimated in the literature is not to say that real sources of horizontal
inequity, both random and systematic, do not exist. But we should not
mistake one problem for another. And we certainly should not mis
take. the limitations of the studies for the limitations of juror decision
making.
In all of these studies, it is impossible to know how well or poorly
the jurors have done because there are almost no data for answering
the inescapable question of "compared to what?" As Kalven and
Zeise! noted long ago, in the study of juries, the usual answer to that
question is: compared to the decision a judge would make in the same
case, because judges are the most likely alternative to jurors.44 More
recently, the answer might include alternative dispute resolution fo
rums in which the decisionmakers might be lawyers (in the role of ar
bitrators) or other professionals (as members of compensation
boards). Studies using a straightforward comparison of damages
awarded by judges and by juries suffer from case selection confounds
because, owing to the strategic choices of lawyers, different mixes of
cases go to juries than go to judges.45 Two recent studies overcame
the "Adversary Culture" (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) (pre
sented at the Biennial Meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Redondo Beach,
Cal., 1998).
41.

See Wissler et al., supra note 27, at 195-202 (Experiment 2).

42. Jurors evaluating general damages may and should take into account such things as
pre-injury health, post-injury recovery, lifestyle, occupation, and social circumstances. See
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. i (1979).
43.

See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1979).

44.

See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).

45.

See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcend
ing Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992).
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this problem by presenting the same case facts to arbitrators46 and to
senior lawyers,47 as well as to jurors. Both studies found no significant
differences in the general damages awards given by the different types
of decisionmakers.48
Significantly, prior studies tell researchers and reformers little
about how jurors decide awards. As Goodman notes, "[l]ittle is
known about the strategies or cognitive processes used by jurors in de
termining damages."49 Such research is needed because "although
critics tend to focus on the outcomes of jury decisionmaking - liability
verdicts and damages awards - effective evaluation and implementa
tion of policy also require an understanding of the process of jury deci
sionmaking."50
Thus, fundamental questions about jurors' decisionmaking about
general damages remain unanswered. What is the content and organi
zation of people's perceptions of injuries? Given that most people
have little systematic experience evaluating injuries, but generally re
spond with intuitive, "gut" reactions, we might expect considerable
random variation across individuals. How much random variation is
there? By contrast, are systematic variations to be found between so
cial groups? Are major differences to be found in perceptions of inju
ries or in the special challenge of translating those perceptions into
dollar awards?51 Does this translation step reveal its own systematic
differences among groups? Most importantly, do judges and lawyers
see or value injuries differently, or show less variability, than the ordi
nary citizens who serve on juries?
Ill. THE PRESENT REsEARCH
A

Overview

The present study asks how the core attributes of injuries affect
decisionmakers' perceptions of the injuries, how those perceptions are
translated into dollar awards, and whether (and if so, how) these pat
terns of response differ among jurors, judges, and lawyers. This re46.

See Vidmar & Rice, supra note 18.

47.

See Vidmar, supra note 12, at 229-234.

48.

See Vidmar & Rice, supra note 18.

49. See Goodman et al., supra note 27; see also Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and
Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage Awards, 25 L. & SOC'Y REV. 263, 264
(1991) ("Little is known about factors that influence jury damage awards in civil cases.").
50. MacCoun, supra note 12, at 137 (emphasis in original).
51. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition
and Valuation in Law), 101 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage
and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINrY 49

(1998) (a somewhat more technical presentation of the same study as Sunstein et al.);
Wissler et al., supra note 27.
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search took the form of a fractional factorial survey,52 in which numer
ous and diverse injury scenarios were presented to judges, lawyers,
and jurors. The respondents were asked to evaluate the injuries on
several dimensions, to indicate their judgment of the injury's overall
severity, and to provide an appropriate award. Respondents were se
lected from two different states, which were chosen on the basis of
previous research suggesting that the damages awards in one were
characteristically high and the other characteristically low relative to
other states.53 Respondents also were stratified within each state by
their urban or rural location, another factor previous research sug
gested was related to award size.54
The present design avoids the confounding inherent in purely ob
servational research. By presenting an identical set of injuries to ju
rors in both states, and in both urban and rural areas, the factorial sur
vey permits a test of whether awards are a function of where the jurors
reside (that is, economic and cultural differences between states or be
tween rural and urban dwellers within states) or of the mix of cases to
which they are responding. Similarly, by having jurors, judges, and
lawyers respond to exactly the same group of injuries, the present
study eliminates the confounding of the decisionmaker with the case
mix. Thus, unlike passive observational studies, the present design can
distinguish the attributes of the decisionmakers from the attributes of
the cases they are deciding. The comparative nature of the present re
search allows us to see how similar or different the decisionmaking
groups are in their decision processes and responses. Asking respon
dents to evaluate injuries on a separate set of scales and to make gen
eral damages awards allows us to build decision models of both the
injury-evaluation phase of their thinking and the award-making phase,
and to compare these decision processes.
The pattern of findings obtained will imply different diagnoses and
different policy solutions to improving the process of awarding general
damages. For example, if jurors' injury severity evaluations or dam
ages awards were not highly predictable, but no less predictable than
those of judges and lawyers, that would suggest that the problem is not
properly ascribed to jurors, but is attributable to the nature of the de
cisionmaking task, and replacing jurors with judges offers no solution.
Alternatively, if all groups were equally predictable, but jurors relied
exclusively on one dimension of injury, such as mental suffering, while
judges and lawyers relied on a definable mix of all injury attributes,
then differences between decisionmaker groups would imply system-

52 See PETER H. ROSSI & STEVEN L. NOCK, MEASURING SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: THE
FACTORIAL SURVEY APPROACH

{1982).

53.

See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 12.

54.

See generally DANZON, supra note 33.
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atic differences in decisions and outcomes. Similarly, if jurors showed
a high degree of unpredictability in both injury evaluations and
awards, but judges and lawyers showed a high degree of predictability
in both, then it becomes plausible to think that replacing jurors with
judges would produce more stable patterns of awards.
B.

Design

This study is a fractional factorial survey - that is, a fractional ex
perimental design conducted in the manner of a survey.55 The study
utilized 62 injury case summaries, grouped into 31 pairs. Each pair
was heard by a subset of the respondents; each respondent heard one
injury pair. Thus, injury was both a between- and within-subjects fac
tor. The respondents were drawn from three populations - jury
eligible citizens, judges, and lawyers - stratified by rural and urban
counties in the states of Illinois and New York. Respondents rated
each injury on several dimensions and provided damages awards.
1.

Case Summaries

The 62 case summaries were adapted from actual personal injury
cases56 and represented a broad spectrum of injuries. The injuries en
compassed different types: nerve damage and paralysis (e.g., quadri
plegia, temporary paralysis of two fingers); head injuries and brain
damage (e.g., epilepsy, permanent vegetative state); sensory loss (e.g.,
vision, smell); cuts (e.g., on face, legs); harm to internal organs (e.g.,
loss of kidney, spleen); illnesses (e.g., leukemia, lung cancer); bums
(e.g., second degree on lower body, third degree over 80% of body);
and orthopedic injuries (e.g., fracture, sprain, amputation). We did
not include cases in which the plaintiff had died or in which the plain
tiff suffered only emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury.
The case summaries included a description of the nature, severity,
and location of the injury; the nature, painfulness, duration, and re
strictions associated with the treatment and healing process; any anxi
ety, fear, embarrassment, or depression about the injury, its impact,
treatment, or prognosis; the current status of the plaintiff's pain, dis
figurement, mental state, and physical impairment; and the likelihood
and extent of future improvement or deterioration and treatment or
care needs.57 These injury characteristics were suggested by the legal

55.
26.

See generally ROSSI & NOCK, supra note 52.

56. The cases were selected from those identified in a study by Baldus et al., supra note
57. See Appendix A for several examples of case summaries.
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literature,58 workers' compensation schedules,59 British compensation
schedules for personal injury cases,60 and empirical research in this
area.61
The case summaries noted the age of the plaintiff, who was said to
be 37 years old in one case in each pair and 33 years old in the other
case. The plaintiff's age was specified in order to reduce the variabil
ity in awards that would result if compensation for future pain and suf
fering for permanent injuries were based on different life expectancies
(e.g., if some respondents thought they were compensating a 20-year
old for 60 years of pain and suffering while others thought they were
compensating a 60-year-old for 20 years).62 The mid-thirties were cho
sen as representative of a fairly large range of ages and unlikely to in
volve special considerations that might arise for young or elderly
plaintiffs. In order to discover the dimensions along which people
view injuries and determine awards, independent of other contextual
factors, no details were supplied about the plaintiff (other than age) ,63
about the defendant, or about the circumstances that caused the inju
ries.64
58. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 905, 912 cmt. b (1979); 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Damages §§ 240-241, 252-256, 269, 271, 275, 293-387 (1988); 1 MARILYN MlNZER ET AL.,

DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (1993); JEROME MlRzA, ILLINOIS TORT LAW & PRACTICE
(2d ed. 1989); 36 NY JUR. 20 Damages §§ 56-66, 96-99 (1984); MICHAEL J. POLELLE &
BRUCE L. OTTLEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAW (1985); Robert W. Phillpott, Jr., ed., Quantum
Study, 42 LOY. L. REV. 817 (1997); Carl T. Drechsler, Annotation, Excessiveness or Ade
quacy of Damages Awarded for Injuries to Arms and Hands, 12 A.L.R. 4th 96 (1981); Carl T.
Drechsler, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Damages Awarded for Injuries to Legs
and Feet, 13 A.L.R. 4th 212 (1981).

59. See ALBERT J. M!LLU S & WILLARD J. GENTILE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
AND INSURANCE 93-194 (2d ed. 1980); JEFFREY V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS'
COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1989).
60. See PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (4th ed.
1987); JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL
DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES (1992); DAVID A. KEMP & MARGARET S. KEMP,
QUANTUM OF DAMAGES (1992); JOHN MUNKMAN, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND
DEATH (8th ed. 1989); David A. Kemp, Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss, in DAMAGES
FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH (David Kemp ed., 1993).
61. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 26; Baldus et al., supra note 26; Hart et al., supra
note 40; Viscusi, supra note 21; Wissler et al., supra note 27.
62

See Baldus et al., supra note 26; Bovbjerg

et al.,

Valuing Life and Limb, supra note

26.
63. Respondents who requested more information about the plaintiff were told to as
sume that the person was of average good health and had an average lifestyle before the in
jury.
64. A potential criticism of our methodology is that our findings, based on relatively
brief injury descriptions, might not be consistent with those that would be obtained with a
fuller presentation of information, such as at trial. See Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Eb
besen, External Validity of Research in Legal Psychology, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 39 (1979);
Wayne Weiten & Shari S. Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The
Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1979). Few respondents
commented that they did not have enough information about the injuries themselves; those
who requested additional information sought contextual information that we had deliber-
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Sampling Locations

Our sample was stratified by state and, within state, by rural and
urban counties. Illinois was selected to represent a characteristically
low-award state and New York a high-award state.65 For sampling
purposes, population density figures were used to designate counties
as rural or urban.66 In Illinois, Cook County (population density of
about 5,000 people per square mile) was designated urban and coun
ties with fewer than 115 people per square mile were designated rural;
counties with an intermediate population density were not included.
In New York state, Queens, Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties
(population densities ranging between 17,000 and 53,000 people per
square mile) were designated urban. For the jury-eligible sample,
New York counties with fewer than 200 people per square mile were
designated rural, and respondents were not drawn from counties with
an intermediate population density. In order to obtain an adequate
sample of judges and personal injury lawyers, however, New York
counties with an intermediate population density were included
among the rural counties.67

C.

Respondents

We drew representative samples from three populations:
eligible citizens, judges, and lawyers.
1.

jury

Jurors

Random-digit dialing was used to obtain the sample of jury-eligible
(i.e., 18 years or older) citizens (hereafter referred to as "jurors").

ately withheld in order to eliminate its potential confounding effects. As discussed in Wiss·
ler et al., supra note 27, short as opposed to longer injury descriptions did not produce dif
ferences in injury ratings, awards, or the relationship between the two.
65. The median 1988-90 jury award in Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, was $32,550,
compared to from $242,500 to $417,200 in several urban New York counties. See DANIELS
& MARTIN, supra note 12, at 70-71. When the awards were adjusted for differences in the
amount in controversy subject to the jurisdiction of courts in the two states, Cook County's
median award increased to $162,316, but was still well below that of New York urban coun
ties. Median awards in rural counties ranged from $24,868 to $39,180 in Illinois and from
$66,000 to $192,500 in New York. See id.
66. The population density figures were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census at
its internet site at <WWW.census.gov/population/censusdata/90den_stco.txt>. These designa
tions were used for sampling purposes only; the rural/urban variable used in the analyses
relied on the respondents' self-report of where they live Qurors), where jurors in their courts
live Qudges), or where personal injury plaintiffs in their cases live (lawyers).
67. The population density (number of people per square mile) of these intermediate
counties was as follows: twelve counties between 200 and 1000, four counties between 1000
and about 2000, and two counties between approximately 4,500 and 6,500.
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Five hundred fifty-eight jurors completed an interview.68 Accordingly,
each injury pair was heard by 18 jurors. Half of the jurors (279) were
from each state; within each state, two-thirds (186) were from urban
counties and one-third (93) were from rural counties.69
The jurors who completed the survey comprised a variety of edu
cation, income, and age groups. Five percent of jurors had not com
pleted high school, 24% were high school graduates, 32% had at
tended college, 24% were college graduates, and 15% had done some
post-college study or held an advanced degree. Eleven percent of ju
rors had a household income less than $15,000; 23% from $15,000 to
$30,000; 31 % from $31,000 to $50,000; 20% from $51,000 to $75,000;
and 15% over $75,000. The jurors ranged in age from 18 to 92 (mean
= 41, median = 39). We over-sampled male respondents in order to
obtain relatively equal numbers of male (49%) and female (51 % ) re
spondents. Only 12% of the jurors knew someone who suffered from
the condition in one of the scenarios they heard.
·

2.

Judges

We obtained the names of state general jurisdiction civil trial
judges from directories and from the court system's administrative of
fice in each state. Two hundred forty-four judges completed an inter
view.70 Accordingly, most injury pairs were heard by eight judges, but
four pairs were heard by only seven judges.71 Approximately half of
the judges were from each state (124 from Illinois, 120 from New
York). In Illinois, approximately half of the respondents (52%) were
68. The response rate for each area was as follows: Illinois urban, 19%; Illinois rural,
28%; New York urban, 20%; New York rural, 26%. These are conservatively estimated re
sponse rates. Because the computer-assisted telephone interviewing system used to conduct
the interviews counted calls, not people, we are unable to obtain more exact response rates
than these.
The essential question, however, is whether the respondents are representative of the
populations from which they are drawn. We found the age, income, and education distribu
tions of our respondents to approximate fairly closely the distributions of those demographic
characteristics in each state, as shown by census data. Census data were obtained through
the United State Census Bureau's world wide web pages: venus.census.gov/cdromllookup/
cmd=tables/db=C90STF3Nlev=state/FO=FIPS.state!Fl=stab.geo/sel=36,new
[for
New
York]
and
venus.census.gov/cdromllookup/cmd=tables/db=C90STF3Nlev=state/F0=
FIPS.state/Fl=stab.geo/sel=17,new [for Illinois]. The exception is that the lowest income and
education groups are somewhat underrepresented among our respondents, a pattern typical
of telephone survey research.
69. When asked where they live, 48% of jurors said a large city, 19% said the suburbs of
a large city, 7% said a medium-sized city, and 26% said a small town or rural area. For pur
poses of analysis, the first two categories were designated "urban" and the latter two were
designated "rural."
70. The response rate for each area was as follows: Illinois urban, 68%; Illinois rural,
91 %; New York urban, 54%; New York rural, 62%.
71. We were unable to get an eighth judge for each of these four pairs due to the rela
tively small number of civil trial judges in New York courts and their limited availability.
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from urban and half (48%) from rural counties. In New York, due to
the limited number of judges in rural counties, 71 % of the respondents
were from urban counties and 29% were from rural counties.72
Personal injury cases composed from 1 % to 100% of the judges'
caseload (mean = 52%, median = 50%). The judges had been hearing
personal injury cases from 1 to 34 years (mean = 9, median = 7). Most
of the judges (87%) were male. Fifty-seven percent of the judges ei
ther personally knew someone with the condition or had heard a case
involving the injury presented in one of the scenarios they were given.

3.

Lawyers

We obtained the names of lawyers from several different directo
ries.73 Two hundred forty-eight lawyers completed an interview.74
Thus, each injury pair was heard by eight lawyers. Half of the lawyers
(124) were from each state and, within each state, half primarily repre
sented plaintiffs and half primarily represented defendants. In each
state, over half of the respondents (56%) were from urban counties
and almost half (44 % ) were from rural counties.
Personal injury cases composed from 1 % to 100% of the lawyers'
caseload (mean = 69%, median = 80% ) . The lawyers had been han
dling personal injury cases from 2 to 61 years (mean = 22, median =
20). Sixty percent of the lawyers had never served as an arbitrator in a
personal injury case, 14% had done so rarely, 20% occasionally, and
6% often. Although we over-sampled women lawyers, 90% of those
interviewed were men. Seventy percent of the lawyers either person
ally knew someone with the condition or had been involved in a case
in which the plaintiff had the injury presented in one of the scenarios
they were given.
D.

Procedures

Prior to calling the judges and lawyers, we sent each a letter ex
plaining the purpose of the study, the time involvement, and the con
fidentiality of their responses, and advising them of the upcoming
phone call. The mailing included a letter from a prominent member of

72. When asked where most of the jurors in their courts live, 45% of all judges said a
large city, 17% said the suburbs of a large city, 9% said a medium-sized city, and 29% said a
small town or rural area. Thus, across both states, 62% of judges were from urban courts
and 38% were from rural courts.
73. These were the Membership Directory of the Defense Research Institute, the Desk
Reference of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the Martindale-Hubbell Law Di·
rectory, and West's Legal Directories.
74. The response rate for each area was as follows: Illinois urban, 83%; Illinois rural,
86%; New York urban, 70%; New York rural, 74%.
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their state's legal community urging their participation in our research.
Jurors did not receive a letter in advance.
All respondents were contacted by telephone and were asked to
participate in a study of people's decisions about how much monetary
compensation an injured person should receive for general damages.
Respondents were told that they would hear summaries of two cases
and would be asked to give their reactions to each. Respondents also
were told that, in an earlier trial, a jury had found the defendant to be
responsible for the plaintiff's injury and had compensated the plaintiff
for medical expenses and lost earnings. We emphasized that the re
spondent was to focus on how much pain and suffering the injury has
caused the plaintiff and how much money would provide fair compen
sation for those general damages.
The interviewer read the respondent the first case summary, fol
lowed by jury instructions that were adapted from standard instruc
tions used in each state.75 Although instructions for the two states dif
fered somewhat and therefore created a slight confounding of
instructions and population, using instructions that correctly reflected
the law in each state was necessary to have credible instructions for
the judges and lawyers.
Respondents then were asked to indicate how much money they
would award the plaintiff for general damages, how much they
thought the average juror would award the plaintiff, and to rate the
plaintiff's injury on five dimensions. This entire procedure was then
repeated for the second case. Finally, the respondents were asked so
ciodemographic questions.76
E.

1.

Measures

Awards for General Damages

A review of the awards for general damages for each injury re
vealed that the highest award for some injuries was more than five
times as large as the second highest award.77 Of the 62 injuries, these
75. See Appendix B. The instructions used for Illinois respondents were adapted from
ILLINOIS pATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CivIL, §§ 30.00-30.05 {3d ed. 1994). The instruc
tions used for New York respondents were adapted from NEW YORK PATIERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CivlL § 2:280 {2d ed. 1994).
-

-

76.

Appendix B contains the interview protocol used.

77. Respondents who gave an award of zero were dropped from the study if the reason
for their award was (a) they felt the defendant was not responsible {despite the fact that the
stimulus materials had stated that a prior jury already had established the defendant's liabil
ity), or (b) they did not believe in the concept of compensation for general damages. If a
potential juror in an actual trial expressed the latter attitude during jury selection, the person
would be excluded from the jury. During the trial, the judge would admonish a juror ex
pressing this attitude that the law had established the plaintiff's right to compensation for
general damages and that one's duty as a juror was to determine a fair amount. Respon
dents who gave a zero dollar award were retained if they gave reasons such as: the pain was
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outliers were found in 23 injuries for jurors, 5 for judges, and 6 for
lawyers. Each outlier was recoded to the value at three standard de
viations above the mean of the distribution (calculated without the
outlier). If that recoded value would have altered the rank order of .
the awards, however, the outlier was recoded instead to the value at
the next quarter-standard-deviation increment above the second high
est award. The recoding of outliers to 3 or 4 standard deviations
above the mean reduced their undue influence on the distribution
without the loss of data.78
After this adjustment, the lawyers' and judges' awards for each
injury showed no serious departures from normality. The jurors'
awards for some injuries, however, were moderately positively
skewed. Accordingly, we applied a square root transformation to the
awards of all three groups.79 The square root transformation ade
quately reduced the skewness of the jurors' awards without over
correcting the judges' and lawyers' awards, providing a comparable
award measure for the three groups.80

2.

Injury Perceptions

Respondents were asked to give their impressions of the plaintiff's
injuries on several dimensions, each rated on a five-point, Likert-type
scale. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate how much
physical pain, mental suffering, disability, and disfigurement the given
injury will have caused the plaintiff. For each of these dimensions, re
spondents were asked to consider both its amount and duration. Re
spondents also were asked to indicate how severe the injury was over
all.

only temporary; the injury was not disabling, not serious, or caused no permanent damage;
or the plaintiff was unconscious and, thus, did not experience pain and suffering.
78. See generally BARBARA G.
VARIATE STATISTICS {1983).

TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL,

USING

MULTI·

79. The purpose of transforming non-normal distributions is to make them more nearly
normal in order to use statistical procedures that require normality; to use highly skewed
distributions could lead to misleading results. It is important to realize that correlations
among variables depend most heavily on the rank order of cases along each measure and
much less on the relative distances between the cases. The transformations do not alter the
rank order. When looking for relationships among variables, the use of such transformations
advances the effectiveness and validity of the search. Nonetheless some authors have criti
cized the use of such data transformations on the grounds that "defendants and plaintiffs live
in a world of real dollars, not of log dollars." Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at 2077 n.21.
80. A log transformation was not used because it somewhat overcorrected the skewness
in jurors' awards and substantially overcorrected the judges' and lawyers' awards.
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Sociodemographic Characteristics

For all members of the three respondent groups, we recorded their
gender, state, and the rural/urban status of their locale (for jurors,
where they lived; for judges, where their court's jurors lived; and for
lawyers, where plaintiffs in their cases lived). In addition, all groups
were asked whether they knew of someone who had the condition
presented in either of the scenarios they were given. Jurors also were
asked their age as well as their education and income level. Judges
and lawyers were asked what percentage of their caseload was com
prised of personal injury cases and for how many years they had been
hearing or handling personal injury cases. The lawyers also were
asked whether and how frequently they had served as an arbitrator in
personal injury cases.

F.

Analyses

1.

Overview

Two sets of analyses were conducted to examine the factors that
predict respondents' (a) perceptions of the overall severity of the in
jury, and (b) awards for general damages. For each set of analyses,
two sets of factors were used as predictors: the respondents' subjec
tive assessments of the injuries on the dimensions of pain, disability,
disfigurement, and mental suffering; and the respondents' sociodemo
graphic characteristics. All measures were standardized in order to
provide coefficient estimates that could be used to interpret the rela
tive contribution of the predictors within each model and to facilitate
the screening of interactions. The analyses were conducted separately
for jurors, judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and defense lawyers.
Each set of analyses consisted of the following. To accommodate
both the within- and between-subjects aspects of the design, a series of
mixed linear model analyses was conducted to assess the unique con
tribution of each predictor. First, all predictors were entered simulta
neously in a single analysis. Next, interactions among the predictors
were tested . . Finally, nonsignificant terms were sequentially elimi
nated from the model until a final model was obtained that consisted
of significant interactions and main effects that either were significant
or were a component of a significant interaction. To assess the collec
tive predictive strength of the items, multiple regression analyses were
conducted on the full and final models. In addition, the zero-order
correlation of each predictor with awards and overall severity was ex
amined to assess each predictor's total contribution (i.e., both unique
and shared variance).81 Comparisons of the structure and relative

81. See Appendix C for a brief summary of some concepts of regression analysis.
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strength of the models were made across the four respondent groups
and between the award and severity models.
2.

Order Effects

The order in which the injuries in each pair were presented was
counterbalanced. Nonetheless, we examined whether the order of
presentation affected respondents' awards and ratings. The principal
effect of order was that jurors' awards were higher for the second in
jury they heard than for the first one.82 Jurors' ratings of the overall
severity of the injury were somewhat higher for the first injury they
heard than for the second one.83 For judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and
defense lawyers, the order in which the injuries were heard did not af
fect awards or overall severity ratings.84 Finding an order effect for ju
rors but not for judges or lawyers is not surprising, given the jurors'
lack of experience with determining personal injury awards.
Ideally, we would have included order as a predictor in the mixed
models, but we did not so that the sets of analyses across the four re
spondent groups would be parallel. Order could not be included in
the models for lawyers because the order in which the injuries were
heard was confounded with their rural/urban location. The effect of
excluding order from the jurors' analyses is to increase the error vari
ance and, thus, to produce a more conservative estimate of the predic
tive strength of the models.
IV. REsULTS

The results will be presented in four Sections. The first presents
the empirically derived models of the factors that account for judg
ments of injury severity. Separate models were developed for each
group of decisionmakers: jurors, judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and de
fense lawyers. Each model consists of respondents' ratings of four
core attributes of injuries - physical pain, mental suffering, disability,
and disfigurement - plus various demographic factors as predictors.
The second Section presents models, using the same factors as predic
tors, to account for respondents' awards of general damages. The
third Section compares the various decisionmakers' severity assess
ments, awards, and predictions of how much the "average juror"
would award for the same injuries. The final Section demonstrates the

82 F(2,556) = 4.44, p < .05.
83. F(2,554) = 2.54,p = .08.
84. For each respondent group, order interacted significantly with several of the predic
tors when predicting overall severity. When predicting awards, order interacted with pain
ratings for the jurors, but did not interact with any predictors for the judge or lawyer groups.
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variability-reducing power of combining individual decisionmakers
into groups, such as juries.
A

Assessments of Overall Injury Severity: The Role ofInjury
Attributes and Sociodemographic Characteri.stics
1.

Jurors' Assessments

First, we examined the extent to which jurors' ratings of the inju
ries on four core attributes and jurors' sociodemographic characteris
tics predicted their assessments of the overall severity of the injuries.
Combined in a multiple regression analysis, these factors together ac
counted for 72% of the variance in jurors' assessments of the injuries'
overall severity. The four injury attribute ratings combined accounted
for 71 % of the variance. The sociodemographic characteristics to
gether accounted for only 3% of the variance in judgments of overall
severity.85
To examine which particular factors were related to jurors' assess
ments of the overall severity of the injuries, jurors' injury ratings and
sociodemographic characteristics were entered in a mixed linear
model analysis. Both the full model and the final model are shown in
Table lA. In the full model, all items were entered simultaneously.
The final model, which resulted from testing the interactions among
the predictors and sequentially eliminating nonsignificant terms, in
cluded only those items that had a significant influence on judgments
of overall severity or that were a component of a significant interac
tion.
The final model also accounted for 72% of the variance. The rat
ings of each of the four core injury attributes were significantly related
to assessments of overall injury severity. Perceptions of disability and
mental suffering had the largest effect on overall severity judgments,
almost twice as large as the influence of perceptions of pain and dis
figurement. Higher ratings of the injuries on each of these attributes
were associated with greater perceived overall injury severity. Com
paring the relative magnitude of the Betas with the relative magnitude
of the bivariate correlation coefficients,86 we see that the contributions
of pain and disfigurement in the multivariate analysis were reduced

85. The variance accounted for by individual predictors, or groups of predictors, does
not simply add together to equal the amount of variance accounted for by all of them com
bined because the components often are somewhat redundant. As here, the total variance
accounted for seems to be less than the sum of its component parts. Other times, see infra
Section IV.B.1, the combined variables can account for more than the sum of their parts.
86. See Table lA. The Betas reflect only the unique contribution of each item, whereas
the r's reflect both unique and shared contributions combined. For an explanation of the
statistical terms used in this Section, see Appendix C.
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because of the variance in severity they shared with disability and
mental suffering ratings.87
None of the sociodemographic characteristics had a significant ef
fect on perceptions of overall injury severity.88 The main effects of
state, income, and age were included in the final model because each
was a component of a significant interaction, not because they them
selves were significant predictors.
Several of the injury ratings interacted with other predictors to af
fect judgments of overall severity: pain and state of residence, pain
and disability, pain and income, and disfigurement and age. For each
of the interactions, higher ratings of the injury attribute led to signifi
cantly higher overall severity ratings at all levels of the other injury
rating or sociodemographic characteristic, but the size of the effect
varied depending on the level of the other factor. Specifically, percep
tions of pain had a larger influence on the overall severity judgments
for jurors in New York than for jurors in Illinois. In addition, pain
ratings' contribution to overall severity tended to decrease as the level
of disability increased and as the jurors' household income increased.
Disfigurement ratings made a smaller contribution to the severity
judgments of younger jurors than of other jurors. Although statisti
cally significant, the contribution of each interaction was small relative
to that of each of the four injury ratings and did not change the inter
pretation of the injury ratings' contribution to judgments of overall se
verity.

87. The inter-item correlations among the four injury ratings ranged from .49 to .67; the
correlations among the sociodemographic characteristics ranged from .01 to .18, with the
exception of r = .45 for income and education; and the correlations between the two sets of
factors ranged from .01 to .13.
88. Familiarity with the injury might not have been significantly related to overall se
verity ratings for several reasons. First, only a relatively small portion {12 %) of the jurors
knew someone with the particular injury they were asked to judge, making it more difficult
to detect an effect. Second, it is plausible that knowing someone who had a serious injury
has the opposite effect on severity ratings as does knowing someone who had a minor injury.
That is, familiarity with a minor injury might confirm its minimal impact and produce lower
severity ratings than if one were not familiar with that injury. Conversely, an understanding
of the truly devastating impact of major injuries may produce higher severity ratings than if
one were not familiar with the injury. These countervailing responses might cancel each
other out.

\j

TABLE 1: OVERALL INJURY SEVERITY ASSESSMENTS

11>

B

�

A Jurors' Assessments
Bivariate
Variable

r

All items entered
simulataneouslJl
F
Beta

mental suffering
pain
disabi lity

.74
.59
.75

.37

disfigurement

.61

.15

state
rural/urban

-.01
.09

-.06

gender

.03

.04

income

-.10

.03

education

-.12

age
familiar with injury

.34
.16

195.76 ***
57.27 ***

Fin!!! model
df

Beta

F

.34
.19

193.65 ***
53.86 ***

221.73 ***
47.06** *

.35
.17

209.17 ***
57.58***

2.27
2.29

.05

2.29

--

--

--

--

.03

-.03

1.23
2.10
1.89

-.03

-.02

1.83

-.03

-.02

.01

.22
2
(R = .72)

--

.05

--

-.08
-.05
-.04
.04

2.21

11>
...,
....
\0
\0

Interactions

(1,478)
(1 ,478)
(1,478)
(1,478)

C)

�
�

(1,504)

�

.......

--

2.96 +

t1

(1,504)

s::i

--

5.68*

7.48**
5.24 *

5.01 *
2
(R = .72)

�

(1 ,478)

pain x state

(1,478)

pain x disability

(1,478)

pain x income

(1,478)

disfigurement x age

�

�
�

Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .02 to .03.
*** p < .001
** p < .01
* p < .05
+ p < .10

�
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Judges' Assessments

The same approach was used to model and account for judges' as
sessments of overall injury severity. Ratings of injuries on the four
core attributes, together with the judges' sociodemographic charac
teristics, accounted for 70% of the variance in their assessments of the
injuries' severity. The four injury attribute ratings accounted for 69%
of the variance; the sociodemographic characteristics combined ac
counted for only 2% of the variance in judgments of overall severity.
In the final model, which accounted for 69% of the variance, rat
ings of each of the four core injury attributes were significantly related
to assessments of overall injury severity (see Table lB). Ratings of the
extent of disability made the largest contribution to overall severity
judgments, followed by ratings of mental suffering. Ratings of disfig
urement and pain also made significant, although substantially
smaller, contributions to perceptions of severity. Higher ratings of the
injuries on each of these attributes were associated with greater per
ceived overall injury severity. Comparing the relative magnitude of
the Betas with that of the bivariate correlation coefficients, we can see
that the contributions of mental suffering, disfigurement, and pain
ratings were reduced because of the variance in overall severity that
they shared with disability ratings.89
None of the sociodemographic characteristics made a significant
contribution to perceptions of overall injury severity. However, the
state in which the judges presided interacted with disability ratings to
affect overall severity judgments. Specifically, disability made a larger
contribution to overall severity ratings for New York judges than for
Illinois judges. Because higher disability ratings led to significantly
higher overall severity ratings for both New York and Illinois judges,
the interaction did not alter the interpretation of disability's influence
on severity judgments. The contribution of the interaction was similar
in magnitude to the contribution of disfigurement and pain ratings.

89. The inter-item correlations among the four injury ratings ranged from .39 to .60; the
correlations among the sociodemographic characteristics ranged from .02 to .33, with the
exception of r = .55 for the percentage of personal injury cases in the judges' caseload and
rural/urban location; and the correlations between the two sets of factors ranged from .01 to
.14 .

0

TABLE 1: OVERALL INJURY SEVERITY ASSESSMENTS (CONTINUED)

l

B. Judges' Assessments

�

....

Variable
mental suffering
pain

Bivariate
r

All items entered
simulataneousl�
F
Beta

Beta

F

Final model
df

.71
.46

.34
.10

88.S6***
8.78**

.33
.09

87.21***
9.07**

(1,206)
(1,206)

disability

.76

.48

176.33***

.S3

177.71***

(1,206)

disfigurement

.49

.08

6.S2*

.10

10.16**

(1,206)

state

-.03
.08

.33

-.01

.OS

(1,23S)

rural/urban

.07
.OS

1.S3

gender

.04

.OS

.33

familiar with injury

-.06

-.01

.13

% caseload that is personal injury

.11

.37

# years hearing pi cases

.03

.02
-.02

.63
2
(R = .70)

Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .03 to .OS.
*** p < .001
** p < .01
* p < .OS

�
�
Interactions

Q

�
Cl)

�
....
-.13

S.72*
2
(R = .69)

(1,206)

disability x state

l
�
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Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Assessments

Together, the plaintiffs' lawyers' injury ratings and their sociode
mographic characteristics accounted for 78% of the variance in their
judgments of the injuries' overall severity. The four injury attribute
ratings accounted for 78% of the variance; the sociodemographic vari
ables together accounted for only 3 % of the variance in judgments of
overall severity.
In the final model, which also accounted for 78% of the variance,
ratings on each of the four core injury attributes made a significant
contribution to assessments of overall severity. Ratings of the extent
of disability made the largest contribution to judgments of overall se
verity, followed by mental suffering (see Table lC). Ratings of pain
and disfigurement made significant but considerably smaller contribu
tions. Higher ratings of the injury on each of these dimensions con
tributed to greater perceived overall injury severity. The contribution
of mental suffering, pain, and disfigurement ratings in the multivariate
analysis was reduced because of the variance in overall severity ratings
shared with disability.90
None of the sociodemographic characteristics made a significant
contribution to perceptions of overall severity.91 Rural/urban setting
interacted with ratings of mental suffering to influence judgments of
overall injury severity, although it did not alter the interpretation of
the relationship of mental suffering and severity. Mental suffering
made a slightly greater contribution to severity ratings for plaintiffs'
lawyers whose clients came mostly from rural settings than for those
whose clients came mostly from urban settings. The contribution of
this interaction was comparable to that of the pain and disfigurement
ratings.

90. The inter-item correlations among the four injury ratings ranged from .40 to .53; the
correlations among the sociodemographic characteristics ranged from .01 to .33; and the cor
relations between the two sets of factors ranged from .01 to .16.
91. The number of years that the plaintiffs' lawyers had been handling personal injury
cases was not included in the multivariate analyses because of missing data. But it appears
from the very small bivariate correlation between number of years in personal injury prac
tice and overall severity ratings, r{l47) = -.01, that no relationship exists between these vari
ables.

TABLE 1: OVERALL INJURY SEVERITY ASSESSMENTS (CONTINUED)
C.

Variable
mental suffering
pain

Bivariate
r
.80
.S7

Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Assessments

All items entered
simulata·neously
Beta
F
.40
.11

disability

.80

disfigurement

.44

.S2

.10

state

-.04

-.03

67.74 ***
7.28**
86.4S "'**
6.47*

.23

ruraVurban

.08

.01

.02

gender
familiar with injury

.07

-.07

.46

-.07

.OS

1.88

% caseload that is personal injury

.OS

-.01

.11

how often serve as pi arbitrator

-.02

-.01

.01
2
(R = .78)

Final model
df

Beta

F

.32
.12

70.lS ***
8.8S**
99.72 **"'

.4S
.11

7.74 **

.01

.01

Interactions

ti

I

j

(1,106)
(1,106)
(1,106)
(1,106)

�-

(1,121)

(1:>

�
-

�
.13

4.07*
2
(R = .78)

(1,106)

mental suffering x ruraVurban

�

�

f!l

Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .04 to .06.
*** p < .001
** p < .01
* p < .OS

�
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Defense Lawyers' Assessments

Defense lawyers' injury attribute ratings and their sociodemo
graphic characteristics together accounted for 75% of the variance in
their assessments of the injuries' overall severity. The four injury rat
ings accounted for 75% of the variance; the sociodemographic charac
teristics together accounted for only 1% of the variance.
The final model accounted for 75% of the variance. Perceptions of
mental suffering made the largest contribution to assessments of over
all severity in the final model (see Table 1D), followed by disability
ratings. Ratings of disfigurement made a significant though substan
tially smaller contribution to overall severity. Pain ratings made no
significant independent contribution to overall severity judgments, but
instead influenced overall severity indirectly through pain's relation
ship with the other injury attributes. Comparing the relative magni
tude of the Betas with the relative magnitude of the bivariate correla
tion coefficients, we see that the effect of pain, and to a lesser extent
disfigurement, in the multivariate analysis was reduced because of
shared variance.92
None of the sociodemographic variables made a significant contri
bution to perceptions of overall injury severity,93 and none of the pre
dictors interacted significantly to influence severity ratings.

92. The inter-item correlations among the four injury ratings ranged from .31 to .46,
with the exception of r = .72 for disability and mental suffering; the correlations among the
sociodemographic characteristics ranged from .01 to .21; and the correlations between the
two sets of factors ranged from .01 to .13.
93. The number of years that the defense lawyers had been handling personal injury
cases was not included in the multivariate analyses because of missing data. But it appears
from the very small bivariate correlation between number of years in personal injury prac
tice and overall severity ratings, r(165) .04, that no relationship exists between these vari
ables.
=

ti

TABLE 1: OVERALL INJURY SEVERITY ASSESSMENTS (CONTINUED)
D.

Variable
mental suffering
pain
disability
disfigurement
state
ruraVurban
gender
familiar with injury
% caseload that is personal injury
how often serve as pi arbitrator

Bivariate
r
.79
.46
.79
.47
.02

.03
-.06
-.07
-.01
-.09

i

Defense Lawyers' Assessments
All items entered

simulataneousl:i
F
Beta
101.66** "'
.48
1.77
.05
56.01 ***
.37
8.04**
.10
.57
-.05
.05
.42
.08
.31
.01
.01
-.04
.88
.04
1.13
(R' = .75)

Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .03 to .05.
*** p < .001
** p < .01

Beta
.47
.39
.11

<11
....
....
\0
\0

Final model
df
F
105.19*** (l,110)
69.54***
10.36**

�
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(1,110)
(1,110)
Q

�

�

�
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Comparison ofInjury Severity Models Across the Four Groups

By comparing the final models for each group of decisionmakers,
we can learn about the factors, the weights of those factors, and the
predictability of the judgments of overall severity made by jurors,
judges, and lawyers. The similarities among these diverse decisiort
makers are far more striking than their differences. The judgments of
all four groups were highly predictable, and the factors that had great
influence - as well as those that had little or no influence - were
very similar among all groups.
The predictability of severity judgments, as measured by the total
proportion of variance accounted for by each of the final models, was
large and similar for each of the groups: 72% for jurors, 69% for
judges, 78% for plaintiffs' lawyers, and 75% for defense lawyers. For
all groups, variation in severity ratings was to a far greater extent the
product of differences in the injuries being responded to than it was
the product of individual differences among the respondents. The
variation of responses of different people to the same injury was small
and similar across the four groups.94 That is, members of each group
responded similarly in assessing the severity of the injuries involved in
a given case. And, as one should expect, the variation in responses of
the same person to different injuries was many times larger than that
of different people to the same injury.95
For all four groups, the only main effects that remained in the filial
models as significant predictors of overall severity were the core injury
attributes - none of the socio-demographic characteristics made a
significant contribution. For jurors, judges, and plaintiffs' lawyers,
disability made the largest contribution, followed by mental suffering;
pain and disfigurement made significant but smaller contributions.
The model for defense lawyers differed from the other three in that
mental suffering was the most powerful influence while disability was
second,96 and pain did not make a significant unique contribution to
overall severity. Interactions involving sociodemographic characteris
tics played only a small role in the models: the magnitude of their in
fluence was fairly small, and none changed the interpretation of the
injury ratings' influence on overall severity assessments.

94. The between-subjects covariance parameter estimate was .006 for jurors,
judges, -.003 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and .06 for defense lawyers.
95. The within-subjects covariance parameter estimate was .27 for jurors, .31
.23 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and .17 for defense lawyers.

-.008

for

for judges,

96. Shared variance could explain the reduced impact of disability for defense lawyers
compared to the other groups. For them, the correlation between disability and mental suf
fering was r = .72, while it was smaller for the other groups.
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Predicting General Damages Awards: Translating Injury
Judgments into Dollars

The same predictive data and the same modeling techniques as
above were used to account for the general damages awards. In con
trast to the high degree of predictability of perceptions of injury se
verity, models for general damages awards show less prediCtability and
greater decisionmaking complexity. Even so, across the groups of de
cisionmakers, a considerable degree of similarity remains in the pat
terns of variables that influence the damages awards.

1.

Jurors' Awards

We examined the extent to which jurors' perceptions of the inju
ries on the four core attributes97 and their sociodemographic charac
teristics predicted awards (which had been square-root transformed).
Combined in a multiple regression analysis, these factors accounted
for 21 % of the variance in awards. Ratings of the four core injury at
tributes accounted for 17% of the variance; the sociodemographic
characteristics accounted for only 2 % of the variance in awards.
The final model accounted for 23% of the variance in awards for
general damages. Of the four injury ratings, perceptions of disability
had the greatest impact on awards, more than twice as large as ratings
of either mental suffering or disfigurement (see Table 2A). Higher
ratings of the injury on each of these three attributes were associated
with larger awards. Pain ratings did not have a significant unique ef
fect on awards when combined with the other predictors. Given the
bivariate correlation between pain ratings and awards, pain apparently
affected awards through its relationship with the other injury ratings.
The influence of pain ratings, and to a lesser extent disfigurement and
mental suffering, was reduced in the multivariate· analysis due to the
variance in awards shared with disability.
Of the sociodemographic characteristics, gender .was the most
strongly related to awards. In fact, the magnitude of gender's influ
ence on awards was second only to that of disability. Income also had
a significant but smaller influence on awards. Male jurors gave larger
awards than female jurors, and jurors with higher household incomes
gave larger awards than those with lower incomes.
Several of the predictors interacted to affect awards in a manner
that altered the interpretation of the injury attributes' influence on
awards. Examining the interaction of disfigurement ratings with
rural/urban residence showed that as perceptions of disfigurement in-

97. Because the four specific injury ratings were highly correlated with overall severity
ratings, overall injury severity was not included as a predictor of. awards in order to avoid
multicollinearity.
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creased, awards increased for urban jurors but not for rural jurors.
The nature of the interaction of pain ratings and education was such
that as pain ratings increased, awards increased for those jurors who
were college graduates but not for jurors with other levels of educa
tion. Finally, the interaction of disfigurement and disability ratings
showed that as the perception of disfigurement increased, awards in
creased only at the higher levels of disability, while higher disability
ratings were related to larger awards at all levels of disfigurement.
The influence of each of these interactions was similar in magnitude to
the impact of mental suffering and disfigurement ratings and house
hold income.
In sum, jurors gave larger awards when they saw the injuries as in
volving a greater degree of disability and mental suffering and when
the jurors were male or had a higher household income. Greater per
ceived disfigurement led to giving larger awards only when it was as
sociated with higher levels of disability and only for urban jurors.
Greater perceived pain led to giving larger awards only for college
graduates.

TABLE 2: PA1N AND SUFFERING AWARDS

(SQUARE-ROOT TRANSFORMED)

A. Jurors' Awards

tl

§
�
�

......

Variable
mental suffering
pain
disability
disfigurement
state
ruraVurban
gender
income
education
age
familiar with injury

Bivariate
r
.34
.24
.38
.32
.05
.08
-.12
.07
.07
.02

-.01

All items entered
simulataneousl)!
Beta
F
.13
10.61**
.02
.24
.28
46.54***
.12
10.86**
-.05
.61
-.05
.47
.26
15.79***
.11
8.25**
2.21*
.05
.02
.40
.02
.44
(R2 = .21)

Beta
.13
.02
.31
.15

Final model
df
F
10.69**
(1,481)
.38
(1,481)
57.06*** (1,481)
4.59*
(1,481)

-.05
.26
.11
.06

.45
15.74***
8.41**
2.63

(1,505)
(1,505)
(1,505)
(1,505)

-.13
.10
.08

5.28*
12.88***
7.23***
(R' = .23)

(1,481)
(1,481)
(1,481)

�
�

-

Interactions

c;)

�
Cl)

i:l
-

disfigurement x ruraVurban
pain x education
disfigurement x disability

j
�

Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .03 to .07.
*** p < .001
** p < .01
* p < .05

-....]
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Judges' Awards

Judges' perceptions of the injuries and their sociodemographic
characteristics accounted for 44 % of the variance in square-root
awards. The four injury attributes accounted for 40% of the variance;
the sociodemographic variables accounted for only 4 % of the variance
in awards.
The final model accounted for 42% of the variance in judges'
awards for general damages. Of the four injury ratings, disability had
the greatest influence on awards, almost twice as large as that of men
tal suffering (see Table 2B). Disfigurement ratings had a smaller, but
significant, impact on awards. Higher ratings of the injury on each of
these three dimensions were associated with larger awards. Percep
tions of pain did not have a significant unique influence on awards
when combined with the other predictors, although its bivariate cor
relation with awards was moderate. Pain apparently does not affect
awards independently but does so through its relationship with the
other ratings. The effect of perceptions of pain, and to a lesser extent
perceptions of mental suffering and disfigurement, was reduced be
cause of shared variance.
Of the sociodemographic characteristics, only the state in which
the judges presided affected their awards. New York judges gave
larger general damages awards than did Illinois judges. Additionally,
the state in which the judges presided interacted with disability ratings
to affect awards. Specifically, disability had a greater impact on
awards for New York judges than for Illinois judges, although higher
disability ratings led to significantly larger awards in both states. The
influences of the state and of the interaction were similar in magnitude
to the effect of perceptions of mental suffering.
In sum, judges gave larger awards when they saw the injuries as in
volving a greater degree of disability, mental suffering, and disfigure
ment, and when the judges presided in New York courts rather than in
Illinois courts. Perceived disability had a greater effect on awards for
New York judges than for Illinois judges.
·
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TABLE 2: PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS (CONTINUED)
B.

Variable
mental suffering
pain
disability
disfigurement
state
rural/urban
gender
familiar with injury
% caseload that is personal injury
# years hearing pi cases

Bivariate
r

.53
.36
.58
.38
.14
.12
.02

-.04
.11
-.01

g

�

Judges' Awards

All items entered
simulataneousl:i
F
Beta
.24
26.41***
.04
.75
.34
51.95***
8.66**
.13
8.42**
-.22
1.69
-.12
1.41
.14
.49
-.03
.07
.01
1.30
-.04
(R2 .44)
=

Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .04 to .07.
*** p < .001
** p < .01

(1)
...
......
\0
\0

Beta
.25

-.49
.12
-.23
---

---

--

-.21

Final model
F
df
27.85*** (1,212)
-68.06*** (1,212)
8.02**
(1,212)
10.40**
(1 ,236)
-----(1,212)
9.56**
(R2 = .42)
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Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Awards

Plaintiffs' lawyers' perceptions of the injuries and their sociodemo
graphic characteristics accounted for 37% of the variance in their
square-root awards. The four injury attributes accounted for 34 % of
the variance; the set of sociodemographic characteristics accounted for
only 1 % of the variance in awards.
The final model accounted for 48% of the variance in awards for
general damages. Of the four injury attributes, disability had the
greatest impact on awards in the final model, followed by mental suf
fering (see Table 2C). Higher ratings of the injury along these dimen
sions were associated with larger awards. Perceptions of pain and dis
figurement did not have a significant effect on awards in the
multivariate analysis, despite their moderate bivariate correlations
with awards. Thus, pain and disfigurement did not affect awards inde
pendently but through their relationship with the other ratings.
Of the sociodemographic characteristics, only the state in which
plaintiffs' lawyers practiced had even a marginally significant influence
on awards. Specifically, New York plaintiffs' lawyers tended to award
more than did Illinois plaintiffs' lawyers. None of the other demo
graphic characteristics were associated with awards.98
Several of the predictors interacted, having a substantial effect on
awards and altering the interpretation of the effect of injury attributes
and demographic characteristics on awards. First, the state in which
the lawyers practiced interacted with how often they had served as an
arbitrator in personal injury cases. New York plaintiffs' lawyers who
had frequently served as arbitrators gave larger awards than those
who had served less often, while the pattern was reversed for Illinois
plaintiffs' lawyers. Second, the interaction of familiarity with the type
of injury presented and rural/urban practice indicated that familiarity
with the injury led to significantly larger awards for urban plaintiffs'
lawyers but had no effect on rural lawyers' awards. Third, the interac
tion of disfigurement and disability ratings showed that perceptions of
greater disfigurement were significantly related to larger awards only
at the highest level of disability, while higher disability ratings were
related to larger awards at all levels of disfigurement. Fourth, disabil
ity perceptions and state interacted such that although higher disabil
ity ratings were related to larger awards for plaintiffs' lawyers in both
states, the magnitude of the relationship between disability ratings and
awards was almost twice as large in New York as in Illinois. Finally,
98. The number of years that the plaintiffs' lawyers had been handling personal injury
cases was not included in the multivariate analyses because of missing data, but it appears
from the very small bivariate correlation between number of years in personal injury prac
tice and awards, r(148) .05, that no relationship exists between these variables.
=
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perceived disability interacted with the frequency with which the law
yers had served as arbitrators, but no systematic, interpretable pattern
appeared.
In sum, plaintiffs' lawyers gave larger awards when they saw the
injuries as involving a greater degree of disability and mental suffer
ing. If they practiced in New York rather than in Illinois, they were
marginally more likely to give larger awards. Moreover, five different
interaction effects emerged, consisting of complex relationships in
volving either the perception of disability or the location (state as well
as urban/rural) of their law practice.

-...]
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TABLE 2: PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS (CONTINUED)
c.

Variable
mental suffering
pain
disability
disfigurement
state
rural/urban
gender
familiar with injury
% caseload that is personal injury
how often serve as pi arbitrator

Bivariate
r
.50
.35
.53
.40
.02
.05
-.05
-.01
.02
.06

Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Awards

All items entered
simulataneousl�
F
Beta
10.94**
.26
.18
-.03
.28
13.93***
2.81 +
.11
3.18+
-.18
.17
.05
1.73
.20
2.8+
.09
.17
-.02
1.23
.06
(R2 = .37)

Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .05 to .11.
*** p < .001
** p < .01
* p < .05
+ p < .10

Beta
.28

Final model
df
F
17.16•** (1,106)

Interactions

27.28***
.63
3.89 +
.42
-2.46

(1,106)
(1,106)
(1,118)
(1,118)

�

(1,118)

o;·
l:::i

1.97
17.03***
-.25
6.88*
.23
17.05** •
4.97•
-.21
.14
8.60**
(R2 =.48)

(1;118)
(1,118)
(1,106)
(1,106)
"(1,106)
(1,106)

.46
.05
-.19
.06
-.20
-.30

-.44
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Defense Lawyers' Awards

Defense lawyers' perceptions of the injuries and their sociodemo
graphic characteristics accounted for 52 % of the variance in their
square-root awards. The four specific injury ratings combined ac
counted for 50% of the variance in awards; the sociodemographic
characteristics together accounted for 4 % of the variance in awards.
The final model accounted for 58% of the variance in general
damages awards. Perceptions of mental suffering had the greatest im
pact on awards (see Table 2D). Disability and disfigurement ratings
also had a significant effect on awards. Higher ratings of the injury on
each of these dimensions were associated with larger awards. Pain
ratings had no significant independent effect on awards, despite a
moderate bivariate correlation. Thus, pain influenced awards indi
rectly through its relationship with the other injury ratings. The influ
ences of disfigurement and disability also were somewhat reduced be
cause of the variance in awards they shared with the other injury
ratings.
The state in which the defense lawyers practiced was the only soci
odemographic characteristic to have a significant effect on awards.99
Defense lawyers practicing in New York awarded more than those in
Illinois. The magnitude of the impact of state on awards was compa
rable to that of disability ratings.
Several of the predictors interacted to affect awards. The signifi
cant interaction of mental suffering and perceived di�ability had an ef
fect on awards comparable in magnitude to that of disability ratings
and the state in which the lawyers practiced. The nature of this inter
action was such that greater perceived disability resulted in larger
awards only at the highest level of mental suffering, while greater per
ceived mental suffering led to larger awards at each level of disability,
with an increasing impact as the level of disability increased. The in
teraction of pain and disfigurement ratings showed that greater per
ceived pain led to larger awards only at the highest level of disfigure
ment, and greater perceived disfigurement led to larger awards only at
moderate and severe levels of pain. Finally, the interaction of per
ceived disfigurement with the proportion of the defense lawyers'
caseload that was personal injury work showed that higher disfigure
ment ratings were significantly related to larger awards only for those
defense lawyers for whom personal injury cases comprised half or less

99. The number of years that the defense lawyers had been handling personal injury
cases was not included in the multivariate analyses because of missing data, but it appears
from the very small bivariate correlation between number of years in personal injury prac
tice and awards, r(166) = -.08, that no relationship exists between these variables.
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of their caseload. The influence of these latter two interactions on
awards was comparable in magnitude to that of disfigurement ratings.
In sum, defense lawyers gave larger awards when they saw the in
juries as involving a greater degree of mental suffering, disability, and
disfigurement and if they practiced in New York rather than in
Illinois. The influence of disability, disfigurement, and pain was quali
fied by three significant interactions with other predictors.

0

TABLE 2: PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS (CONTINUED)

8
�

D. Defense Lawyers' Awards

Variable
mental suffering
pain
disability
disfigurement
state
rural/urban
gender
familiar with injury
% caseload that is personal injury
how often serve as pi arbitrator

Bivariate
r

.66
.37
.60
.47
.10
.03
-.01
-.10
-.06
-.i4

All items entered
simulataneousl�
Beta
F
.38
31.21***
.23
.03
.23
10.26**
.18
11.85***
7.54**
-.24
.04
-.02
.59
-.15
-.01
.01
-.05
1.00
-.03
.40
(R2 = .52}

Beta
.40
.03
.23
.14
-.24
----.06
-.20
.13
-.12

Final model
F
df
39.32*** (1,104)
.46
(1,104)
11.77*** {l,104)
8.53**
{1,104)
8.28**
{l,120)
---1.82
{1,120)
-15.19*** (1,104)
8.58**
(1,104)
8.18**
{1,104)
{R2 = .58)

(1)
...
.....
\0
\0

�
Interactions

�
Cl>

i:l
t:J
mental suffering x disability
pain x disfigurement
disfigurement x % caseload pi

�
l:l

�
<->

Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .04 to .08.
*** p < .001
** p < .01
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Comparison ofAward Models Across the Four Groups

Earlier, we had seen that the regression models predicting overall
injury severity ratings for all four groups of decisionmakers showed
the groups to be remarkably similar in nearly every respect. The re
gression models in this Section aim to account for variation in the gen
eral damages awards. With these models, we see a decline in predict
ability for all four groups and greater divergence among them. At the
same time, important parallels continue to exist.
The final models for each group accounted for a moderate propor
tion of the variance in awards: 23% for jurors, 42% for judges, 48%
for plaintiffs' lawyers, and 58% for defense lawyers. Although it is
more difficult to predict the awards made by all of these decisionmak
ers, the translation from perceptions of injury severity to damages
awards has led to the greatest decline in predictability for the model of
jurors' decisions. Of course, this may be as much a statement about
the limitations of the predictive model to capture what jurors are do
ing as it is a statement about the jurors' decisions.
Nonetheless, confirming the preceding impressions, the variation
of responses of different people to the same injury was greater for ju
rors than for the other groups.100 These patterns of predictability and
intra-injury variability in awards are not surprising, given that jurors
have essentially no experience assigning a dollar value to injuries
while the other groups do. In addition, had we been able to include an
order term in the jurors' model to reflect the fact that there was a sig
nificant order effect for jurors (which was not found for the other
groups), the error variance for jurors likely would have been re
duced.101
For all groups, the variation in responses of the same person to dif
was much larger than that of different decisionmakers
to the same injury.102 The somewhat lower variability in awards for
defense lawyers when the same person was reacting to different inju
ries suggests they may be less responsive to case details. Thus, the
greater predictability of awards for defense lawyers does not necessar
ily mean they are "better" at this task, but instead that their responses
might be less nuanced or more mechanical.
For all groups, some of the variability in awards might be due to
the fact that, in order to avoid potentially confounding contextual fac
tors, the case summaries did not describe the plaintiffs or their pre-

ferent injuries

100. The between-subjects covariance parameter estimate was .21 for jurors, compared
to .06 for judges, .01 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and 02 for defense lawyers
.

101. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
102. The within-subjects covariance parameter estimate was .56 for jurors, .47 for
judges, .48 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and 35 for defense lawyers.

December 1999]

General Damages

795

injury lifestyles. Depending on the extent of changes in a plaintiff's
work, family, and recreational life, the same injury could be seen to
have a different impact on different plaintiffs and, thus, merit different
awards. Numerous judges and lawyers requested information about
the plaintiff's gender, occupation, lifestyle, family, and other back
ground details.103 For instance, some wanted to know the plaintiff's
gender because they felt a scar on a female plaintiff's face would war
rant more compensation than the same injury for a male plaintiff.
Thus, award variability might be greater because respondents brought
different assumptions about the plaintiff to bear on the task.104
The respondent groups showed important similarities in the role
that injury attributes played in their awards, but also some differences.
For all four groups, pain ratings had no significant unique influence on
awards. For jurors, judges, and plaintiffs' lawyers, perceptions of dis
ability had the greatest impact on awards - about twice as large as the
impact of the second strongest predictor - while for defense lawyers,
perceptions of mental suffering had the largest effect on awards. Men
tal suffering had a significant effect on awards for all four groups.
Perceived disfigurement had a significant impact on awards for all
groups except plaintiffs' lawyers. For all groups except judges, the in
terpretation of the effect of some of the injury attributes was qualified
by significant interactions with the sociodemographic characteristics.
In all instances, higher ratings on the injury attributes were associ
ated with larger awards. This suggests considerable vertical equity in
awards - that all groups gave larger awards to plaintiffs with injuries
involving a greater degree of disability, mental suffering, and (except
for plaintiffs' lawyers) disfigurement. Additional data provide evi
dence of considerable vertical equity for all groups. For each injury,
the mean award and mean assessment of overall injury severity were
calculated within each respondent group. These items then were cor
related, using the injury scenario as the unit of analysis (n = 62). The
correlation between overall severity and awards was .83 for jurors, .88

103. Recall that, if they inquired, respondents were told that the plaintiff was of average
good health and had an average lifestyle before the injury, which seemed to be sufficient
information for most of the respondents.
104. It is interesting to note that, during the interviews, lawyers and judges requested
information that, legally, should have no relevance for awards for general damages, but
which revealed their own search for shortcuts to estimating general damages. For instance,
they wanted to know the amount of the plaintiff's medical expenses and lost wages so that
they could use a formula to calculate awards for general damages. That judges and lawyers
sometimes grasped at such shortcuts suggests that they did not have much better bearings
than jurors in the chartless seas of determining general damages awards. They also wanted
to know the effect of the injury on employment status. Relatedly, Vidmar & Rice, supra
note 18, at 896-97, found that experienced lawyers serving as arbitrators tended to make
more improper use of information than lay jurors had, such as using evidence of liability to
fix damages and increasing the size of awards to cover attorneys' fees.
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for judges, .77 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and .88 for defense lawyers.105
Thus, all groups gave larger awards to plaintiffs with injuries seen as
more severe and smaller awards to plaintiffs with injuries viewed as
less severe.
One or more demographic variables had a significant and large ef
fect on the awards for each of the four groups. Judges and lawyers in
New York gave larger awards than did their counterparts in Illinois.106
Comparing the moderate multivariate influence of state on awards
with its smaller bivariate relationship in each of these groups suggests
that state suppressed irrelevant variance in the other variables in the
equation. This may suggest that a constellation of subtle differences
exists between New York and Illinois judges and lawyers, which in the
multivariate analysis is captured by the single variable of state. For
jurors, the state in which they lived was not related to awards, but
gender and household income were, with male jurors and jurors with
higher incomes giving larger awards.107
C.

Comparing Jurors', Judges', and Lawyers' Injury
Severity Assessments, Awards, and Predictions
ofthe "Average Juror's" Awards

Next, we compare the general tendencies of jurors, judges, plain
tiffs' lawyers, and defense lawyers, as groups, to perceive injuries as
more or less serious and to give awards that are relatively higher or
lower. In addition, we report a number of analyses relating to respon
dents' estimates of what the "average juror" would award.

105. Calculating these correlations without first averaging across people, that is, using
the respondent instead of the injury as the unit of analysis, produces these relationships: .38
for jurors, .65 for judges, .61 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and .71 for defense lawyers. The lower
correlation for jurors no doubt reflects the greater variability noted above.
106. Larger awards by New York judges and lawyers may reflect the fact that New York
instructions explicitly include compensation for "loss of enjoyment of life," while the Illinois
instructions do not specify that this component should be considered in determining general
damages. Compare NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ClvIL § 2:280.1 (2d ed.
1994) with ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS Clv!L, §§ 30.00 - 30.05 (3d ed. 1994).
Cutting the other way, New York instructions direct that compensation be given only for
conscious pain and suffering, while Illinois instructions do not address this issue. Compare
NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ClvIL § 2:280 cmt. (2d ed. 1994) with ILLINOIS
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS Clv!L, § 30.05 (3d ed. 1994). Although this difference
would tend to produce smaller awards in New York, it was unlikely to have much effect in
the present study because the plaintiff was not conscious of her or his condition in only two
of our 62 injuries.
-

-

-

-

107. Gender might not have been related to awards for judges or lawyers because only a
relatively small portion of each group was female (13% of judges, 13% of plaintiffs' lawyers,
and 7% of defense lawyers), making it more difficult to detect an effect. Or perhaps because
they have learned to see damages in similar ways regardless of their gender.
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Comparison of Overall Severity Assessments

Do the four different groups of decisionmakers, in the two differ
ent states, vary in their perceptions of the severity of the injuries, so
that some see the same injury as more severe and others see it as less
severe? To answer this question, for each respondent group, the mean
overall severity rating was calculated for each injury, separately within
each state. Table 3 presents these data, averaged across the 62 inju
ries. A repeated-measures analysis of variance ("ANOVA") was then
conducted to compare the severity judgments across the groups, using
injury as the unit of analysis.

TABLE 3: RATINGS OF OVERALL lNJURY SEVERITY
Jurors
Judges
Plaintiffs' Lawyers
Defense Lawyers

Illinois

New York

3.64
3.31
3.52
3.12

3.63
3.46
3.42
3.17

Note: Each cell represents a mean taken over all 62 injuries.
Ratings were made on a five-point scale, with 5 designated as "extremely severe."

In each state, the four respondent groups differed in their assess
ments of overall injury severity.108 For Illinois respondents, follow-up
analyses showed that jurors rated the injuries as more severe than did
judges109 and defense lawyers,110 but did not differ from plaintiffs' law
yers. Plaintiffs' lawyers rated the injuries as more severe than did
judges.111 Defense lawyers rated the injuries as less severe than did all
other groups.112 For New York respondents, follow-up analyses
showed that jurors rated the injuries as more severe than all other
groups,113 and defense lawyers rated the injuries as less severe than all
other groups.114 Plaintiffs' lawyers' severity ratings did not differ sig
nificantly from judges' ratings. Thus, jurors tended to rate the injuries
as more severe than the other groups, and defense lawyers rated them
as less severe than the other groups.
108. Illinois: F(3,183)
109. F(l,61)

=

=

14.78, p < .001; New York: F(3,183) = 11.70, p < .001.

27.75, p < .001.

110. F(l,61) = 34.02, p < .001.
111. F(l,61)

=

6.33,p < .05.

112. Versus jurors: F(l,61) = 34.02, p < .001. Versus judges: F(l,61)
Versus plaintiffs' lawyers: F{l,61) 16.66, p < .001.

=

5.12, p < .05.

=

113. Versus judges: F(l,61) 1.41, p < .01. Versus plaintiffs' lawyers: F(l,61)
< .05. Versus defense lawyers: F{l,61) 30.88, p < .001.
=

=

7.13, p

=

114. Versus judges: F(l,61) 15.63, p < .OOL Versus plaintiffs' lawyers: F(l,61)
p < .05. Versus jurors: F(l,61) = 30.88, p < .001.
=

=

6.88,
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To what extent did the different groups agree on which injuries
were more severe and which less? Correlations were computed using
the mean overall severity ratings calculated for each group, separately
for each injury. Jurors' overall severity assessments were highly cor
related with those of the other groups. In Illinois, the correlation of
jurors' severity ratings with those of judges was r = .84; with those of
5
plaintiffs' lawyers, r = .72; and with those of defense lawyers, r = .74.11
In New York, the correlation of jurors' severity ratings with those of
judges was r = .90; with those of plaintiffs' lawyers, r = .82; and with
those of defense lawyers, r = .81.116 The intercorrelations of overall se
verity ratings among judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and defense lawyers
ranged from .69 to .78 in Illinois and from .76 to .85 in New York.
Thus, injuries seen as more severe by one group tended strongly to be
seen as more severe by the other groups.
2.

Comparison ofAwards

Do the four different groups of decisionmakers, in the two differ
ent states, vary in the damages awards they offer, such that some
award more and others less for the same injury? To answer this ques
tion, for each respondent group, the mean square-root award was cal
culated for each injury, separately within each state. Table 4 presents
these data, averaged across the 62 injuries. A repeated-measures
ANOVA was conducted to compare the awards across the groups,
with injury as the unit of analysis.
TABLE 4: GENERAL DAMAGES AWARDS

Jurors
Judges
Plaintiffs' I..a\V)'ers
Defense I..a\V)'ers

Illinois

New York

665
567
780
561

746
716
817
659

Note: Each cell represents a mean taken over all 62 injuries.
The damage awards are square-root transformations of dollar distributions.

In Illinois, awards differed by respondent group.117 Follow-up
analyses showed that jurors' awards did not differ from those of plain
tiffs' lawyers, but both gave awards that were larger than those of

115. For each of the preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the significance level was
p < .001.
116. For each of the immediately preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the signifi
cance level wasp < .001.
117. F(3,183) = 155, p < .001.
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judges118 and defense lawyers.119 Defense lawyers' awards did not dif
fer significantly from judges' awards. In New York, awards differed
marginally by respondent group.120 Follow-up analyses showed that
jurors' awards were marginally larger than those of defense lawyers121
and did not differ from those of judges and plaintiffs' lawyers. Plain
tiffs' lawyers' awards were significantly larger than those of defense
lawyers122 and marginally larger than those of judges.123 Defense law
yers' awards were marginally smaller than judges' awards.124 Thus, in
both states, plaintiffs' lawyers and jurors tended to give the largest
awards, while defense lawyers tended to give the smallest awards.
Given that jurors tended to rate the injuries as more severe than the
other groups (and the defense lawyers rated them as least severe), and
that the relationship between severity assessments and awards is
strong, it would not be unreasonable for jurors' awards to be commen
surately larger (and defense lawyers' awards smaller).
To what extent did the different groups agree on which injuries de
served higher general damages awards and which were entitled to
lower awards? Correlations were computed using the mean square
root award for each injury within each group, using injury as the unit
of analysis. Jurors' awards were highly correlated with those of the
other groups. In Illinois, the correlation of jurors' awards with judges'
awards was r = .73; with plaintiffs' lawyers' awards, r = .63; and with
defense lawyers' awards, r = .71.125 In New York, the correlation of ju
rors' awards with judges' awards was r = .69; with plaintiffs' lawyers'
awards, r = .60; and with defense lawyers' awards, r = .66.126 The inter
correlations among the judges' and lawyers' awards ranged from .73 to
.83 in Illinois and from .66 to .83 in New York. Thus, injuries that
were given larger awards by one group also tended to be given larger
awards by the other groups.

118. Versus jurors: F(l,61)
< .01.

=

659, p < .05. Versus plaintiffs' lawyers: F(l,61) = 11.01, p

119. Versus jurors: F(l,61) = 6.64, p < .05. Versus plaintiffs' lawyers, F(l,61)
<.01.

=

12.69, p

120. F(3,183) = 256, p = .06.
121. F(l,61) = 2.88,p = .095.
122. F(l,61) = 5.14, p < .05.
123. F(l,61) = 2.97,p = .09.
124. F(l,61) = 2.88, p = .095.
125. For each of the preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the significance level was
p < .001.
126. For each of the inlmediately preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the signifi
cance level wasp < .001.
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Comparison ofEach Group's Award with Its Prediction of the
"Average Juror's" Award

Do the four different groups of decisionmakers, in the two differ
ent states, vary in their estimates of how much the "average juror"
would award in general damages? Do some groups expect jurors to
give awards that are more different from their own awards than other
groups do? Are some groups' estimates of jurors' awards closer to the
awards actually given by jurors in this study than other groups' esti
mates? Respondents in each of the four groups were asked, after indi
cating their own award, what they thought the "average juror" would
award for the same injury. Each group's median award and median
predicted "average juror" award were calculated for each injury, sepa
rately within each state.127 Dependent-group t-tests then were con
ducted.
The estimated jurors' awards given by New York judges were
larger than the awards they themselves gave,128 while those estimated
by Illinois judges did not differ from their own awards. Defense law
yers in Illinois129 and New York130 both gave estimated jurors' awards
that were larger than the awards they themselves gave. Plaintiffs' law
yers' awards did not differ from their predicted jurors' awards in either
state. And jurors themselves gave estimated "average juror" awards
that were larger than the awards they themselves gave.131
Despite differences in the award amount predicted, all groups gave
larger predicted jurors' awards to the injuries for which they them
selves gave larger awards, and gave smaller predicted awards to the
injuries for which they themselves gave smaller awards. In llinois, the
correlations between each group's own awards and their predicted
"average juror" awards were r = .91 for jurors, r = .49 for judges, r =
.82 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and r = .93 for defense lawyers.132 In New
York, the correlations between each group's own awards and their
predicted "average juror" awards were r = .88 for jurors, r = .95 for
judges, r = .96 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and r = .89 for defense Iawyers.133
Thus, all groups expect jurors' vertical equity to be quite similar to
their own.
127. Because the data for this group of analyses consisted of raw damages estimates,
medians were used to reduce the influence of outliers.
128. t(61) = 3.60, p < .01.
129. t(61) = 3.32, p < .01.
130. t(61) = 2.67, p < .05.
131. Illinois jurors: t(61) = 3.17, p < .01. New York jurors: t{61) = 3.60, p < .01.
132. For each of the preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the significance level was
p < .001.
133. For each of the immediately preceding correlations,
cance level wasp < .001.

n = 62 injuries and the signifi
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How well could judges and lawyers predict what awards jurors
would give? Within each state, we compared judges' and lawyers'
"average juror" awards with the actual awards given by the jurors in
our study. In Illinois, the awards actually given by jurors were smaller
than what plaintiffs' lawyers134 and defense lawyers135 predicted they
would be, but did not differ from the judges' predictions. In New
York, the awards given by jurors were smaller than what judges136 and
defense lawyers137 predicted they would be, but did not diffe r from the
plaintiffs' lawyers' predictions. Generally, then, the awards jurors ac
tually gave tended to be smaller than the awards judges and lawyers
predicted they would give.
Correlations between jurors' actual awards and the awards pre
dicted for them by judges and lawyers tell us how well those legal pro
fessionals could anticipate which injuries would evoke larger and
which would evoke smaller awards from jurors; that is, the extent to
which judges and lawyers could predict the vertical variation in jurors'
responses to injuries. These correlations varied considerably. In
Illinois, the correlations between jurors' actual awards and the awards
predicted for them by both plaintiffs' lawyers138 and defense lawyers139
were significant, while the correlation with the awards predicted by
judges was only marginally significant.140 In New York, the correla
tions between jurors' actual awards and the awards predicted by
judges141 and defense lawyers142 were significant, but the correlation
with plaintiffs' lawyers' predicted awards was not.143 The range in
these correlations (from .21 to .78) is striking, especially considering
that it is plaintiffs' lawyers who do both best (in Illi nois) and worst (in
New York) at anticipating the vertical variation in jurors' reactions to
the injuries.

D.

The Stabilizing Power ofAggregation into Groups

Thus far, we have been speaking as though jurors made decisions
individually, as judges do in bench trials, rather than in groups, as ju
ries. The greater observed variability in the awards of jurors, as com-

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142
143.

t(61) =2.19,p < .05.
t(61) = 2.45, p < .05.
t(61) = 2.10, p < .05.
t(61) = 2.49,p < .05.
r(60) = .78,p < .001.
r(60) = .37,p < .01.
r(60) = .24, p = .06.
r(60) = .46,p < .001.
r(60) = .41,p < .001.
r(60) = .21, p = .10.
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pared to those of judges and lawyers, would decrease if the individuals
were combined into juries, as they are in actual trials. That group de
cisions decrease in variability (and increase in predictability) com
pared to the decisions of the individuals who compose the groups, is to
be expected both from basic statistical144 and social psychological145
properties of groups. In addition, studies that have tested this ques
tion directly using mock jurors and juries have found that, for the
same case, awards of deliberating juries are less variable than awards
of jurors deciding damages as individuals.146 Thus, the data we have
presented to this point, on individuals, overstates the variability.147
Our final set of analyses is essentially (and merely) a demonstra
tion of the phenomenon that when individuals decide as groups their
144. Larger samples produce distributions with smaller standard errors than smaller
samples. For example, a set of samples of size 6 or 12 as compared to samples of size 1.
145. People in decisionmaking groups tend to coalesce toward a consensus; their shifts
tend to be toward, rather than away from, each other. This is a basic aspect of group be
havior, which has long been observed. See, e.g., A. PAUL HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMALL
GROUP REsEARCH 19 {1976) (groups tend to establish norms which are viewed as legitimate
by group members); MUZAFIR SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 104 {1936)
(people in social interaction gravitate toward sharing the perceptions and judgments of those
with whom they interact).
146. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages:
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAULL. REV. 301, 316 tbl. IV
{1998) {finding the standard deviation of their individual jurors' general damages awards to
be $4,255,056 compared to $714,556 for decisions on the same case facts by deliberating ju
ries); Shari S. Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, UNDERSTANDING JURIES (forthcoming)
(using data from a completely different set of jurors and a completely different case and
finding the standard deviation of jurors' awards to be $175,988 and of juries' awards to be
$122,749).

147. The only suggestion to the contrary of which we are aware appears in Sunstein et
al., supra note 51. They allude to the familiar notion that larger groups (such as juries) show
less variability than smaller groups or individuals. But they also argue that there exists an
"amplification of bias" by which group deliberation would produce greater variance than
was found in their study of individual mock jurors. See id. at 2101 n.128. This argument con
fuses several principles upon which it relies. Sunstein et al. are correct that group delibera
tion produces group polarization, a post-deliberation shift toward positions more extreme
than the prediscussion central tendency of the individuals. See, e.g., Martin F. Kaplan, Dis

cussion Polarization Effects in a Modified Jury Decision Paradigm: Informational Influ
ences, 40 SOCIOMETRY 262 (1977); Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a
Polarizer ofAttitudes, 12 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 125 (1969); David G. Myers &
Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOL. BULL. 602 (1976). But
they overlook the fact that groups tend to coalesce around that more extreme position.
Thus, in a given case, groups will be more consistent than individuals at the same time that
they will be more extreme (in whichever direction). When Sunstein et al. jump from the
phenomenon of deliberation-induced shifts to the conclusion of "even greater variance,"
Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at 2101 n.128, they have jumped from thinking about the vari
ance for a given case to the variance of the mass of cases. That is, some types of cases \viii
shift one way and some the other way, resulting in greater variance across a set of different
cases. But that phenomenon irrelevant to the policy issue of variability among like cases.
The unwanted variability in cases is not that different cases receive different awards (vertical
equity requires that they do), but that any given case would receive different awards from
different decisionmakers (that would be horizontal inequity). The available evidence sup
ports the conclusion that variance declines when we move from jurors to juries. See supra
note 146.

is
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decisions are more consistent and predictable .than when they decide
the same question as individuals. These analyses were conducted on
only the first of the two injuries evaluated by each of our respondents;
that is, all 62 injuries were included, but only the data of those that
were the first of the pair a respondent heard.
Treating each decision by a judge as if it were a decision in a bench
trial, we calculated the standard deviation of those raw general dam
ages awards. This is analogous to calculating the standard deviation
for a set of awards from a sample of bench trials in a jurisdiction.
When considering the same set of injuries, the standard deviation of
awards made by Illinois judges was approximately 2.3 million and by
New York judges about 1.5 million. Doing the same analysis for indi
vidual jurors, as if they decided cases individually as judges do, we find
much greater variability in response to the same set of injuries. The
standard deviation for Illinois jurors was about 10.0 million, and for
New York jurors about 16.6 million.
To estimate the awards that would be made if individual jurors had
been grouped into juries and asked to decide awards as a group, we
created statistical groups by taking the median148 of the raw awards of
all jurors who evaluated the same injury, for each of the 62 injuries,
separately within each state. In this way we made "juries" of 4 or 5
persons each. Although the mix of injuries is as varied as in either of
the preceding analyses, the standard deviation shrinks considerably:
to about 755,000 for Illinois "juries" and about 543,000 for New York
"juries." Thus, the awards of juries were less varied than those of
judges.149
These analyses do not purport to give the actual standard deviation
that would be obtained by combining the actual individuals into
groups and having them reach consensus in group deliberation. These
analyses merely illustrate the phenomenon and its general tendencies,
namely, that groups produce more stable and more predictable esti
mates than individuals.15° Considering that there were few extreme

148. The median of individual judgments provides a very good estimate of the group
judgment. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to
Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & SOC'Y REV. 513, 545
tbl. 4 (1992), which found that using medians of individual pre-deliberation judgments to
estimate group decisions correlated .62 with the decisions of deliberating juries composed of
those same individuals. By contrast, other plausible methods of statistically estimating the
group decision had lower, sometimes much lower, correlations.
149. A better test of this, but a far more expensive one, would have jurors deliberate as
groups, and would treat those group judgments as the ones to be modeled and compared to
those of judges and lawyers.
150.

Moreover, larger groups do so to a greater extent than smaller groups. See Michael
The Smaller the Jury, the Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JUDICATURE 263 (1996);
see also Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury
Size, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 451, 463-64 (1997).

J. Saks,
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outliers to begin with,151 it is easy to see how a juror recommending an
extreme award could be outnumbered and reined in by the majority of
jurors preferring more moderate awards.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

This concluding Part will begin by summarizing the study's findings
(Sections A through C). Section D will consider the implications of
the findings for legal policy concerning the determination of general
damages by juries. Section E will raise further empirical research
questions that remain to be asked and answered.
A

Perceptions ofInjury Severity

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the analyses ex
amining the different decisionmakers' judgments of the overall sever
ity of the injuries.
First, the regression models suggest that different decisionmakers
- people with different roles in the legal system, different experience
with personal injury cases, and different demographic backgrounds relied on the same injury attributes in similar ways and gave them
similar relative weight when evaluating the severity of injuries.152 For
all groups, the extent of perceived disability and mental suffering were
the strongest predictors of overall severity judgments, with disfigure
ment and pain making smaller contributions.153 The only notable de
parture from the pattern was the model for defense lawyers, for whom
mental suffering had the most powerful influence (whereas for the
other three groups it was disability) and pain did not have a significant
unique influence. Nevertheless, all of the regression models ac
counted for a large, and similar, proportion of variance in the deci
sionmakers' judgments of overall severity: 69% for judges, 72 % for
jurors,154 75% for defense lawyers, and 78% for plaintiff's lawyers.
Second, all four groups of decisionmakers had generally similar
perceptions of what injuries are of relatively greater or lesser severity.
Shared vertical equity is evident from the finding that jurors' overall
severity assessments were highly correlated with those of the other
groups, ranging from .72 to .84 in Illinois and from .81 to .90 in New

151. See the Measures section, supra Section III.E.l, for a discussion of how we identi·
fied extreme outliers. They constituted 232% of the jurors' awards. For comparison, ex·
treme outliers constituted 1.03% of judges' and 1.21 % oflawyers' awards.
152 See Table 1.
153. A similar pattern was seen in the two studies in Wissler et al., supra note 27.
154. Similarly, in the two studies in Wissler et al., supra note 27, at 189, 200, under·
graduates' injury perceptions accounted for 75% and 89%, respectively, of the variance in
their overall severity assessments.
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York. Jurors tended to assess injuries as being more severe than the
other groups did, while defense lawyers tended, even more strongly, to
see injuries as less severe than the other groups did. Nonetheless, in
juries seen as more severe by one group tended strongly to be seen as
more severe by the other groups.
The remarkable similarity across the varied decisionmakers' re
sponse patterns when judging the severity of injuries has important
implications. The findings suggest that jurors approach the task of
evaluating injuries no differently than judges and lawyers do. Thus,
assertions that jurors cannot intelligently evaluate injuries or have
idiosyncratic reactions to injuries are simply incorrect, or at least ill
focused. Indeed, if any one group emerges as being out of step with
all of the others, it is defense lawyers. This has somewhat paradoxical
implications. When members of the defense bar evaluate the per
formance of jurors, and gauge them to be off the mark,155 these law
yers no doubt reach that assessment by comparing the jurors' conclu
sions to their own. But their own impressions of injuries are the ones
that depart most from the pattern shared by the other decisionmaking
groups, at least in regard to judgments of injury severity.
Third, for all groups, while the core attributes of injuries accounted
for the lion's share of variance in severity judgments, the sociodemo
graphic variables played essentially no role. Because a finding that the
background characteristics of the decisionmakers have little or no im
pact on their decisions may surprise readers unacquainted with the
relevant literature, it may be worth mentioning that this merely ex
tends a finding now well established elsewhere in the jury decision
making literature. Though most of that research has been on criminal
trials, juror sociodemographic characteristics also have been found to
play only a modest role in their civil liability verdicts,156 certainly com
pared to the dominant impact of evidence and arguments presented in
the cases. The present study, along with other recent research, sug
gests that what had been learned about liability verdicts can be ex
tended to damages-relevant responses: individual differences make
little difference.157

155. For example, James Griffith, an attorney specializing in medical malpractice de
fense, wrote, "There's no limit on what jurors can award for pain and suffering, so too often
they act like Santa Claus, handing out millions of dollars in cases involving comparatively
minor injuries." James Griffith, What it Will Take to Solve the Malpractice Crisis, MED.
ECON. Sept. 27, 1982, at 195.
156. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know
and Do Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178, 180 (1990); Steven D. Penrod, Predictors of Jury
Decision-making in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Field Experiment, 3 FORENSIC REP. 261
(1990); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should)
Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. lNTERDISC. LJ. 1, 9-13 (1998).
157. See Diamond et al., supra note 146, at 314 (finding, in a study that used a video
taped presentation of a highly realistic simulated trial to 1042 mock jurors from Cook
County, Illinois, that "[o]ur attempt to trace the sources of this variation [in damages
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The picture becomes somewhat blurred when the transition is
made from perceptions of the overall severity of injuries to placing
dollar values on them. First, for awards, the regression models for the
different groups of decisionmakers differed more from each other in
terms of the factors that account for awards as well as the relative in
fluence of the core injury attributes and the sociodemographic charac
teristics.158 Second, the model for each group of decisionmakers ac
counted for a smaller proportion of the variance in awards than in
severity assessments.
While similarities were found, different respondent groups gave
differing weight to the various injury attributes when awarding dam
ages. Defense lawyers differed from all other groups in that for them
mental suffering weighed more heavily than disability. And plaintiffs'
lawyers differed from all other groups in that for them disfigurement
did not have a significant impact on awards. Thus, the impact of the
injury attributes on jurors' awards more closely resembled their im
pact on judges' awards, and their impact on the lawyers' awards di
verged from both judges and jurors. Nonetheless, there were impor
tant similarities among the decisionmakers regarding which injury
attributes were predictive of their general damages awards. For all re
spondent groups, perceived pain was related to awards only indirectly
through its association with the other injury attributes, while greater
perceived disability and mental suffering were strongly associated with
larger awards.159
Compared to the models of severity assessments, sociodemo
graphic characteristics played a larger role in awards, both directly and
through their interaction with other factors. For jurors, gender and
income were predictive in both states. Men and wealthier jurors
awarded more than women and poorer jurors. One explanation for
these findings might be that in a task as undefined as awarding general
damages, people rely on the only reference scale with which they are
familiar, namely their own. Those who are accustomed to dealing in
larger amounts fit the cases onto a mental reference scale that runs
into higher numbers. This would explain not only the finding that
wealthier individuals give higher awards, but also that on average men
give higher awards than women. Another explanation might be more
cultural: that something in their value system leads people of higher

awards] to individual differences in the background and attitude of jurors met with little suc
cess"); see also id. at 307 tbl. I.
158. See Table 2.
159. For jurors and lawyers, some of the main effects of the injury attributes are quali
fied by interactions. See the Results Section, supra Section IV.B, for the details.
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socioeconomic status to place a higher monetary value on personal
injuries and their sequella.
In contrast to jurors, the significant demographic variable for
judges and lawyers in this study was state. Generally, judges and law
yers in New York gave larger awards than those in Illinois. Several
explanations are possible. For the same reasons that wealthier jurors
gave larger awards, it may be that wealthier lawyers and judges (i.e.,
the ones in New York) give larger awards. Another possible explana
tion is the differences between the two states in the laws regarding
damages awards. In New York, loss of enjoyment of life is considered
a distinct element of damages, but in Illinois it is subsumed as part of
mental suffering. This would be expected to lead to higher awards by
New York judges and lawyers. Though all respondents were read the
instructions based on those in their state, the same effect might not
have arisen for jurors because they are less likely to be attuned to the
finer details in the instructions than are lawyers and judges (indeed,
most of the lawyers and judges presumably already know their respec
tive state's rules).160 Yet another explanation might be that the judges
and lawyers in each state know that theirs is thought to be a relatively
low or high award jurisdiction and act in accord with those expecta
tions, while jurors do not know that they are "supposed" to give
higher awards if they are in New York and lower awards if they are in
Illinois.
Nonetheless, the paucity of relationships between most of the
demographic variables and awards (collectively accounting for only
1 % to 4% of the variance in awards) is the more important part of the
story.161 Several of these non-differences are especially worthy of
note. Illinois jurors did not give awards that differed from those of
New York jurors. And the awards of jurors living in rural areas did
not differ from those of jurors living in urban areas.162 These non
differences contrast with findings of archival studies, which suggested
that, on a national spectrum, New York jurors give relatively high
awards while Illinois jurors give relatively low awards,163 and that ur-

160. Instructions are often difficult for jurors to understand. See Michael J. Saks, Judi
cial Nullification, 68 IND. LJ. 1281, 1282-83 (1993).
161. As noted previously, research has found little relationship between jurors' socio
demographic attributes and the verdicts of the jurors or the juries on which they sit. See su
pra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
162. Although rural or urban locale did not affect the size of awards, it did interact with
perceived disfigurement such that disfigurement had a significant impact on the awards of
urban jurors but not rural jurors.
163. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 12, at 69-90. A possible explanation for the
differences observed by Daniels and Martin is that their data were based on total awards,
and interstate differences in medical expenses, earnings, and the cost of living could account
for differences in awards.
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ban jurors award more than rural jurors.164 Those archival studies
could not control for the kinds of cases that jurors in the different lo
cales were deciding because they had no data on the nature of the
cases themselves, so they could not determine whether observed dif
ferences were due to differences in the tendencies of the jurors or to
differences in the cases being presented to those jurors. Because the
current study presented an identical set of cases to jurors in the two
regions of the two states, our findings suggest that the differences ob
served in those other studies were due not to differences in the jurors
but to differences in the mix of cases that came to trial in the different
locales.165
In addition to differences in the components of the models, awards
were less predictable than were severity assessments. The regression
model for each group, especially for jurors, accounted for a smaller
proportion of the variance in awards: 23% for jurors, 42% for judges,
48% for plaintiffs' lawyers, and 58% for defense lawyers.166 The lack
of information about the plaintiff's gender and pre-injury lifestyle
might have contributed to the variability in awards for all groups. The
jurors' lack of experience in assigning a dollar value seems an obvious
explanation for the greater variability and lower predictability of ju
rors' awards.

164. See DANZON, supra note 33, at 63, 74-75. A possible explanation for the differ
ences observed by Danzon is that her data could reflect differences in medical expenses,
earnings, and the cost of living in urban versus rural areas.
165. Another difference is that Danzon's research used states as the unit of analysis,
rather than individuals or juries. Inferences drawn about relationships at the state level may
or may not hold at smaller levels of aggregation. This problem is known as the "ecological
fallacy." Thus, while Danzon found that urban areas (actually, relatively more urban states)
experienced larger awards than more rural areas (actually, relatively more rural states),
there is no reason to expect her findings to apply to urban versus rural areas within states, or
to people from urban versus rural areas.

166. It is worth noting that the proportions of variance in awards accounted for by the
present data are lower than those of other studies cited in our Introduction. This difference
may suggest an important cognitive insight. Our study had respondents rating each injury
without comparison to others, or in comparison with one other injury (when rating the sec
ond in the pair). Most of the other studies had respondents or coders rating larger numbers
of injuries. No doubt if we had people rank order our 62 cases and then used that as a pre
dictor of awards, the correlation would rise considerably. In our own studies of damages, all
using similar procedures, when each respondent evaluated 12 or 13 cases, the R2 = .74. See
Wissler et al., supra note 27, at 201. When each respondent evaluated 5 cases, the R2 = .54.
See id. at 195. And in the present study, where each juror evaluated 2 cases (so half the time
were evaluating the first of the pair), the R2= .23. If this insight is correct, the higher propor
tions of variance accounted for in the models of judges and lawyers reflect their having (in
their heads, from the numerous other cases they have known) a more complete cognitive
reference scale of injuries to provide a context for thinking about the case now under con
sideration. That, in turn, suggests a relatively simple and yet potentially powerful reform providing jurors with a frame of reference for determining the appropriate general damages
award - that should produce considerable improvement in the predictability and stability of
jurors' awards of general damages. The issue of providing jurors with such guidance is dis
cussed below.
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The decreased predictability of jurors' awards might also be ex
plained by the difference in education, income, and gender between
jurors (as a group) compared to judges and lawyers.167 When looking
only at those subgroups of jurors who most closely approximate judges
and lawyers on these dimensions, we find the greatest predictability of
awards compared to those jurors who are least similar. For jurors with
post-college study or an advanced degree, the full regression model
accounted for 29% of the variance in awards, with progressively lesser
amounts of variance accounted for as the level of education declined,
culminating in a model that accounted for 14% of the variance in
awards for jurors who had not graduated from high school. For jurors
with household incomes over $75,000, the model accounted for 32% of
the variance in awards, with progressively lesser amounts of variance
accounted for as the level of income declined, culminating in a model
that accounted for 20% of the variance in awards for jurors with in
comes below $15,000. And for male jurors, the model accounted for
27% of the variance in awards, compared to 15% for women jurors.
Thus, to some extent, the differences in the predictability of jurors'
awards, compared to those of judges and lawyers, is a product of social
differences and not simply differences in the extent of experience in
awarding general damages for injuries.
Given the small variability in assessments of injury severity within
each respondent group and the strong relationship between overall se
verity assessments and awards, the variability in awards would seem to
be due largely to differences in the metrics people use to convert per
ceptions of injury severity into awards.168 Why didn't we find more
variability in the severity ratings instead of only in the dollar awards?
Perhaps the five-point severity rating scale limits the expression of
one's evaluation of injuries or consideration of subtle distinctions
among them, compared to the more fine-grained and unbounded na
ture of dollar scales. Thus, the lack of variability in severity ratings
might be due to the insufficiency of the rating scale producing an ap
parent consistency in judgments rather than to a truly better quality of
decisionmaking.
Despite the lesser predictability of awards, the correlations be
tween severity ratings and awards (using the injury scenarios as the
unit of analysis) showed a strong association between the degree of
perceived injury severity and the size of the awards given. These cor
relations were .83 for jurors, .88 for judges, .77 for plaintiffs' lawyers,
and .88 for defense lawyers. This finding replicates the high degree of
vertical equity in awards found in other studies.169 In addition, shared

167.
168.

See supra Section III.C.

169.

See studies cited supra notes 26-27.

See related discussions in Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at 2106-07, and Wissler et
al., supra note 27, at 193.
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vertical equity is evident from the finding that jurors' damages awards
were well correlated with those of the other groups, ranging from .63
to .73 in Illinois and from .60 to .69 in New York.170 These findings in
dicate that all groups tended to agree on which injuries deserved
higher general damages awards and which deserved smaller ones.
Even an examination of the absolute level of awards, however,
does not find jurors to be out of line. Averaged over all cases, jurors
and plaintiffs' lawyers tended to give the highest awards, defense law
yers the lowest, and judges gave an intermediate amount.171 What
might account for the higher awards given by jurors? One obvious
"statistical" explanation is that the greater variability of individual ju
rors' awards allows the average to shift upward more readily than
downward. A second, "vertical equity," explanation is that it is ap
propriate that the jurors' awards would be larger than those of other
groups because jurors rated the injuries as more severe. A third pos
sible explanation is an artifact of the media's reporting of jury awards,
which tends to cover higher award amounts.172 While lawyers and
judges would be aware that there are many small awards that are not
reported for every large verdict that is reported, jurors are less likely
to know that, and their frames of reference would be affected accord
ingly. A final possible explanation is an artifact of our interview pro
cedures. By asking judges and lawyers, but not jurors, in both states to
make what they regarded as appropriate awards, regardless of any
caps in effect in their states, we were unavoidably reminding them of
caps, which might have artificially pushed down their awards.
In sum, the way in which the damages decisionmaking models of
jurors differ most from those of judges and lawyers is in their variabil
ity, not in the patterns of the factors that affect their awards. And this
variability among jurors is almost certain to decline when the deci
sionmakers consist of juries.113 This study was not able to do more
than demonstrate that general effect: the awards of (statistically cre
ated) juries were less varied than those of judges, while the awards of
jurors were far more varied than those of judges.

170. The findings of Vidmar & Rice, supra note 18 - that jurors and arbitrators have
similar patterns of correlations of perceptions of disfigurement, etc., with awards - parallel
our own. In both states, our findings showed the lowest correlation was between jurors and
plaintiffs' lawyers, suggesting an interesting area of further study.
171. See Table 4.
172 See Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Me
dia as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 419, 421, 426 (1996) ("It is a small step to assert that reading about million
dollar verdicts might lead people to overestimate the frequency of large jury awards."); see
also Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can Reality be Found in the Illu
sions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 231-34 (1998).
173. See discussion supra notes 144-151 and accompanying text.
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Judges' and Lawyers' Predictions of the Awards
ofthe "Average Juror"

When asked to predict the awards that would be made by the "av:.
erage juror," judges in New York, defense lawyers in both states, and
the jurors themselves, predicted that the average juror would give
awards that were larger than they themselves would give in the same
case. Apparently, the members of most groups, with plaintiffs' law
yers being the unsurprising exception, think that the awards they per
sonally would give are lower than those given by jurors. Despite these
differences in the predicted awards, judges and lawyers expected ju
rors to share their relative assessments of damages - giving larger
awards in the cases where they themselves gave larger awards, and
smaller awards in the cases where they themselves gave smaller
awards.174 Thus, all groups expected the average juror's awards to
have vertical equity that strongly paralleled their own, but to he
shifted upward.
The awards our jurors actually gave tended to be smaller than the
awards the judges and lawyers predicted they would give. One might
expect the expertise of judges and lawyers to include accurate predic
tions of what jurors will do. We would be hesitant to make too much
of this systematic bias (overprediction), except that it is consistent with
findings where lawyers have been asked to estimate the size of jury
awards in their states.175 Systematic errors call for explanations; we
can only speculate on one. A generations-old legal folklore about tbe
excesses of civil jurors, compounded by the public rhetoric of more re
cent years, may prevent lawyers from recognizing what jurors actually
do. Even without such folklore, or perhaps at the root of it, the
"availability heuristic" might be operating176 - a cognitive bias which
suggests that judges and lawyers will have a tendency to more easily
recall surprisingly large awards, and then to estimate the overall be
havior of juries from those more "available," but less representative,
instances.177
174. The correlations between the lawyers' and judges' own awards and the awards they
predicted the "average juror" would give ranged from .49 to .93 in Illinois and from .89 to .96
in New York.
175. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of Empiri
cal Research on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REV. 585 (1988).
176. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre
quency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. '2JJ7 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
177. The correlations between what judges and lawyers predicted the average juror
would award and what our jurors in fact awarded present an odd pattern, with some of the
most wide-ranging correlations found in the entire study. Plaintiffs' lawyers do both the best
(in Illinois, r = .78) and the worst (in New York, r .21) job of predicting our jurors' awards
in the cases. Perhaps the lack of a real pattern is the most one can say about these correla
tions.
=
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Policy Implications

The dominant theme of these findings is one of considerable siini
larity across the various groups of decisionmakers in the structure of
thinking about injury severity and awards. Most importantly, an im
pressive similarity exists in the injury attributes that drive their deci
sions, the weight given to those attributes, and the shared sense of ver
tical equity held by jurors, judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and defense
lawyers alike. These findings suggest that commonly voiced specula
tions about the inability or irrationality of jurors in evaluating injuries
are misconceived, because on that task jurors were nearly indistin
guishable from judges and lawyers. These data also reveal, contrary to
some discussions in the literature, no differences between jurors in two
different states and in different regions of the same state when they
are asked to respond to the same set of injuries.
If there is any basis for concern, it is the translation from percep
tions of injuries into dollar valuations. But that is a problem not with
jurors alone, but with the task - judges and lawyers similarly display
decreased predictability, albeit a smaller decrease, as they move from
severity assessment to damages valuation, and reveal more between
group differences in the models that predict their decisions. Thus, im
provements, if justified as desirable policy, should be concerned less
with who is to make the decisions about general damages and more
with making the task more achievable.
1.

Whether the Role of the Jury Should Be Reduced

Should the role of the jury in making general damages awards be
reduced or eliminated? Should the determination of those awards, as
others have suggested in the context of punitive damages, be trans
ferred from jurors to judges?178 The main argument for doing this is
that judges would produce more predictable awards than juries.179
178. See Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at 2112-13 ("It would be reasonable to react to
our study by suggesting a simple reform: Juries should decide questions of civil liability, just
as they do questions of criminal liability. But judges should decide on the appropriate level
of punitive damages, just as they do criminal punishment, subject, in both cases, to guidelines
laid down in advance."). Sunstein et al. presented 28 variations of 10 case vignettes to 899
randomly selected registered voters in Travis County, Texas, and asked them to (a) evaluate
the cases, and (b) recommend punitive damages awards to assess against the defendants in
those cases. Id. at 2095. Sunstein et al. found that jurors were breathtakingly consistent in
their judgments of the defendant's outrageousness (r = .99), but that variability increased
(reliability and predictability decreased) in the second step, namely translating those judg
ments into punitive awards (r = .42). Id. at 2098, 2103. Sunstein et al. conclude that "indi
vidual differences in dollar awards produce severe unpredictability and highly erratic out
comes," id. at 2103, and implicitly assume, without any data, that judges would make very
different decisions than jurors do, id. at 2113.
179. Perhaps it goes without saying that predictability and consistency might be pur
chased at the cost of more important values. For example, the rule of thumb some lawyers
use to come up with a figure for general damages for purposes of settlement negotiation -
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First of all, it is not clear from the empirical evidence that transfer
ring the task from juries to judges would increase predictability at all,
much less to the satisfaction of those calling for such a reform. Our
findings show a fairly high correlation between awards given by judges
and those given by individual jurors (r's = .73 and .69 in the two states
respectively).180 Based on the decision models we developed, the pre
dictability of jurors' general damages awards, expressed as a correla
tion, is r = .48, while that of judges is .65 .181 That suggests that judges
also are far from perfect. And jurors, as well as judges, perform this
task at a level of reliability that compares favorably to that of other
important societal decisionmaking. As Table 5 indicates, juror evalua
tions of injury severity and damages are of comparable consistency
and predictability to the decisions of a considerable array of other de
cisionmakers who are thought to be far more expert and who are per
forming tasks thought to be much better defined than that of assessing
general damages.

multiplying medical specials by three - would, if adopted as a legal rule for assigning dam
ages, produce highly predictable outcomes, but at the expense of injury- and victim-specific
considerations. Sometimes the amount awarded would be too great and sometimes it would
be too small.
It may be worth noting that some level of variability is beneficial to the legal process.
The proper level of uncertainty helps to promote settlements, while not promoting so many
that courts do not receive the cases necessary to monitor society's disputes, and thereby to
continually refine and announce the law. For more detailed discussion of this point, see
Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 243 (1988). A rational goal would be to aim to calibrate the level of uncertainty to
seek its optimal level, rather than to aim to eliminate uncertainty from the litigation system.
180. Thus, we found higher reliability in awards (in terms of agreement between judges
and jurors) than Sunstein et al. did (in terms of agreement among jurors). Perhaps this re
flects differences in the challenge of assigning dollar values for general damages versus for
punitive damages. If so, it implies that Sunstein et al.'s speculation that their findings would
generalize to other juror decision tasks about damages is unwarranted. Sunstein et al., supra
note 51, at 2131-38.
181. Taking the square root of the R-squareds in Tables 2A and 2B, for jurors and
judges, respectively.
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TABLE 5: RELIABILITY OF VARIOUS DECISIONMAKERS MAKING
VARIOUS DECISIONS

Decisionmakers and Tasks
Jurors evaluating outrageousness of tortious conduct
(reliability)a
Jurors and Judges evaluating injury severity (reliability) (in
IL & NY, respectively)b

Strength of
Association
.99
.84, .90

Jurors evaluating injury severity (predictive validity)b

.85

Judges evaluating injury severity (predictive validity)b

.83

Jurors and Judges deciding amount of general damages
(reliability) (in IL & NY, respectively)b

.73, .69

Judges deciding general damages (predictive validity)b

.65

Juries and Judges deciding on personal injury liability
(reliability)c

.58

Federal judges deciding criminal sentences (reliability)d

.58

Four different kinds of business experts rating strategic
attributes associated with competitive moves in 15 different
companies (reliability)e

.55, .55, .50,
.47

Scientists deciding merits of research proposals (reliability)c

.so

Jurors deciding general damages (predictive validity)b

.48

Doctors diagnosing skin diseases (reliability) {three different
diseases)g

.36, .48, .48

Jurors deciding punitive damages (reliability)a

.42

Employment interviewers deciding on qualifications for
hiring (reliability)h

.40

Navy pilots rating technical effectiveness of aircraft
(reliability) {three different sets of measures)i
Psychiatric diagnoses (reliability)i

.28, .12, .16
.13, .22

Note: Pearson correlations or multiple correlations are in bold; Cohen kappas are in regular
font. In a few instances, the tabled correlation values had to be calculated from rates of
agreement given in the original sources.
The data in the table are taken from the following studies:
a. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
b. The study reported in this Article.
c. Henry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity ofthe CivilJury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964).
d. Shari S. Diamond & Hans Zeise!, Sentencing Councils: A Study ofSentence Disparity
and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975).
e. Ming-Jer Chen et al., An Exploration of the Expertness of Outside lnfonnants, 36
ACADEMY OFMANAGEMENT J. 1614 (1993).

December 1999]

General Damages

815

f. S. Cole et al., Chance and Consensus in Peer Review, 214 SCIENCE 881 (1981).
g. John D. Whited et al., Primary Care Clinicians' Performance for Detecting Actinic
Keratoses and Skin Cancer, 157 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 985 (1997).

h. R.S. Uhrbrock, The Personnel Interview, 1 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 273 (1948).
i. Leonard Adelman & Michael L. Donnell, An Empirical Study Comparing Pilots' In
terrater Reliability Ratings for Workload and Effectiveness, 18 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS 978 (1988).
j. Pierre Leichner et al., A Study of the Reliability of the Clinical Oral Examination in
Psychiatry, 29 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 394 (1984).
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that juries (groups) pro
duce considerably more stable and predictable outcomes compared to
jurors (individuals).182 Consequently, decisions of juries may ap
proach, or even exceed, the stability and predictability of decisions of
individual judges. Without persuasive data to the contrary, entertain
mg a reform that would reduce or eliminate the role of juries in malc
ing damages awards seems premature.
But assuming that, at the end of the day, it ·is concluded that a
marginal advantage in the predictability of general damages awards
favoring judges does exist, is the transfer of responsibility from juries
to judges wise policy? The answer lies in weighing this small gain in
predictability against what would be lost.
A core benefit of juries is the sampling function they provide. The
law apparently has discovered that the best substitute for a market to
generate the values of the sorts of losses subsµmed under gener�
damages is to sample the judgment of the community. Moreover, if it
is to tailor damages to the actual losses incurred, it must do its sam
pling on a case-by-case basis. To accomplish these functions, jUries
not only are quite an efficient method, they are the only available
method. Without juries, the ability to estimate the community's sense
of the value of the ability to see or to hear or to walk or to have chil
dren or to be a whole human being is forfeited. That juries consist of
groups, drawn more or less at random from the community, is essen
tial to the sampling function. Imperfect sampling though it may be, it
is less imperfect than having no sampling at all.
In addition, juries offer several collateral benefits. One is that they
reduce bias by dividing decisionmalcing functions between judge and
jury. The judge is free to know everything, and cari. act to screen out
biasing, speculative, or otherwise inadmissible evidence and argu
ments about what the damages should be. The jury then is able to
consider only proper evidence and arguments in reaching its decisions.
Even when this is imperfect, it is a considerable pnprovement on re-

182 See supra Section IV.D.
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quiring judges to know what a factfinder should not know, and then to
try to decide in spite of that knowledge.183
Another collateral benefit is the "lightning rod" function of juries.
That is, by being the primary decisionmakers, juries become the tar
gets of criticism, thereby drawing the fire away from judges. Moreo
ver, juries can dissipate the attacks better than judges could. A jury
that attracts the ire of the public fades back into the community and is
replaced by another jury for the next trial. In contrast, as judges ren
der one verdict after another, they risk accumulating criticism for suc
cessive unpopular decisions. Further, the unpopular decisions of
judges, unlike those of juries, might be viewed as the edicts of an
unelected elite rather than as the sentiments of the general commu
nity. The very criticism directed at some juries may illustrate their
performance of a lightning rod function.184 To say the least, it is not
obvious that the marginal benefit of increased predictability of judges'
decisions (if such a benefit were to materialize) outweighs the various
benefits provided by the use of juries - especially considering that
most of the time juries reach decisions that judges regard as reason
able.185
2.

Reforms Consistent with the Available Data

Sensible and moderate reforms to reduce unpredictability, focusing
on procedural adjustments, could improve on an essentially sound sys
tem.
One approach would be to increase the size of juries (from the six
or eight civil jurors now found in many federal and state jurisdictions
to the traditional twelve of the common law) in order to reduce un
wanted variability and increase stability and predictability.186
A second method, which emphasizes the diversity among injuries,
would be to provide jurors with descriptions of a range of injuries as a
basis for forming a reference scale with which to compare the case at
bar.187 By seeing the injury under consideration in the context of other

183. Of course, many judges believe that they can perform this cognitive feat, but what
little hard data exist on the subject indicates that judges are no better than jurors at disre
garding evidence they are not supposed to know. See Landsman & Rakos, supra note 18.
184. Especially in cases where jurors have made unpopular decisions with which judges
have not manifested disagreement.
185. See Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CrvrL JURY SYSTEM 248, 262-65 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). It
is also worth noting that the law has mechanisms for reining in the rare runaway jury,
namely additur/remittitur review and appeals.
186. See Diamond et al., supra note 146; Saks, supra note 150; Saks & Marti, supra note
150.
187. See supra note 166 and accompanying text; see also Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at
2104.
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injuries, jurors would gain the advantage possessed by judges and law
yers and insurance claims representatives - an appreciation of the di
verse universe of injuries.
Another powerful yet modest reform would be to pool jury awards
made for similar injuries, and to present these cases and their award
distributions to juries for guidance in reaching their general damages
awards188 and to judges for conducting their additur/remittitur re
views.189 New decisions would continuously be added to update the
data pool.190 In either use, they could be offered as true "guidelines"
- suggestions which could be departed from to the extent that the in
stant case differed from those guideline cases.191 Pooling verdicts in
similar cases, and funneling those back to juries (or judges), magnifies
the benefit of sampling community judgments. Thus, rather than re
ducing the role of the jury, we can reduce a possible disadvantage (un
predictability) by making more use of one of its principal advantages
(sampling). As the data of this study suggest, the problem with gen
eral damages is not who makes the decision; rather, the problem is the
inherent difficulty of the decision being made.

E.

Postscript

The present study leaves open several important questions. Al
though there is a strong underlying similarity of judgments among
groups, especially concerning the nature of injuries, how might the
models of award decisions be improved? Relatedly, what accounts for
any differences that do exist among the models of the groups studied?
Why, exactly, do defense lawyers' decision models depart from those
of the other groups? Why, exactly, are jurors more variable than the
others, even though their decision models are so similar?192
The research described in this Article presented jurors, judges, and
lawyers with bare-bones cases, consisting almost exclusively of facts
about the injuries and their sequella. Understanding how decision188. See Saks et al., supra note 27 (reporting a jury simulation experiment showing that
giving mock jurors guidance tended to reduce the variability of general damages awards for
medium- and high-severity injuries).
189.

See Baldus et al., supra note 26.

190. For details of a methodology for gathering and using such data in courts, see
Baldus et al., supra note 26. See also Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb, supra note 26.
191. Others have discussed these and additional techniques for dealing with this prob
lem. See ABA REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY
SYSTEM 10-15 (1987); ALI REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY, 199-230 (1991); Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb, supra note 26; Diamond et
al., supra note 146; Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for
Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 775
(1995); Sunstein et al., supra note 51.
192. The obvious hypothesis that the latter finding is due to a lack of experience with
the task only that, a hypothesis.
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makers respond to the core attributes of injuries is only a first step.
The models we have obtained can be built upon, layer by layer, sys
tematically adding legally permissible contextual factors that should
influence perceptions of the impact of injuries and the consequent
damages. Then extra-legal contextual factors, including characteristics
of cases, plaintiffs, and defendants, can be added. Although these
ought not to affect damages awards, some of them are likely to, and
identifying them can add to the predictive accuracy of the model. Fi
nally, we can experiment with procedural and evidentiary variations
that may affect the uses jurors (and judges and lawyers) make of the
information they receive, and which may increase the predictability
and decrease the variability of awards. Thus, the models developed in
the present study, which already embody a considerable amount of
predictive power, seem likely to be amenable to improvement through
additional stages of model development.
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APPENDIX A:

EXAMPLES OF INJURY DESCRIPTIONS
The two bones in the plaintiffs lower right leg- were badly broken
in several places. The 33-year-old plaintiffs leg was so disrupted that
repair of the blood vessels was impossible and surgical amputation of
the leg just below the knee was necessary. Over parts of three years,
the plaintiff was hospitalized on many occasions and underwent sev
eral painful operations. The plaintiff was fitted with an artificial leg.
Because the artificial leg causes the leg stump to become raw and in
flamed, the plaintiff can walk for only brief periods.
The 33-year-old plaintiff suffered numerous cuts on the left fore
arm. The cuts required 40 stitches. The injury left several small scars
that are permanent.
The 37-year-old plaintiff suffered scarring of the lungs, which af
fects their ability to absorb oxygen. Also, the lining of the lungs has
hardened, making it difficult for them to move air in and out. These
conditions make the plaintiff short of breath, more susceptible to flu
and pneumonia, and more likely to develop lung cancer. The plaintiff
cannot walk very far without getting winded and becoming exhausted.
The plaintiff will continue to get worse and has a 50-50 chance of dy
ing within five years.
The 33-year-old plaintiff suffered burns that caused blistering and
destroyed tissue on the face and over 80% of the body. The plaintiff's
wounds and their treatment were extremely painful. During the first
two months in the hospital, the plaintiff underwent massive infusions
of blood plasma and a procedure of salves, bandaging, chlorine baths,
and cutting away the dead tissue from the burned areas. Over several
years, the plaintiff had extensive skin graft surgery and received fur
ther treatment. The plaintiff suffered from painful tightening of the
scar tissue, which impaired the mobility of joints and required constant
surgical repairs. All of this required 70 operations, and at least ten
more operations will be necessary over the next ten years. The plain
tiff's skin resembles a patchwork quilt, and extremes of heat and cold
will always be painful.
The 33-year-old plaintiff suffered a broken right wrist. The plain
tiff, who is right-handed, had to wear a cast for one month. For a few
months, the plaintiff's wrist was somewhat weak and less flexible.
Thereafter, the wrist healed completely.
The 33-year-old plaintiff suffered a broken pelvis, such that the
bone was splintered into fragments. In addition, the fragments on the
left side were out of position and surgery was required to set them.
The plaintiff spent one month in the hospital, followed by another
month of bed rest at home. Over the next several months, the plaintiff
gradually was able to walk and to resume normal activities.
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APPENDIX B:
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR JURY-ELIGIBLE CmZENS193

Introduction to the interview:
We are studying people's decisions about how much monetary
compensation an injured person should receive in a lawsuit. We want
to talk to people like you who could end up serving as jurors and
making these kinds of decisions.
The interview will last about ten minutes. I will read you brief
summaries of two real cases and then ask you for your reactions to
them. The cases may contain some graphic details about the injuries.
These cases involve an injured person, called the plaintiff, and the
party responsible for the injury, called the defendant. According to
the law, when the defendant is found to be responsible, plaintiffs are
entitled to receive compensation for their medical expenses, lost
wages, and the pain and suffering they have experienced.
In each case that I'm going to read you, a jury in an earlier trial
found the defendant to be legally responsible for the plaintiff's injury.
Also at that trial, the jury compensated the plaintiff for medical ex
penses and lost wages. So all you have to focus on here is how much
pain and suffering this injury has caused the plaintiff and how much
money would provide fair compensation for that pain and suffering.
So for each case, I am going to ask you to come up with a dollar
amount for the plaintiff's pain and suffering and to give me your im
pressions of the injury. For example, to rate how much physical pain
the injury has caused. If I ask any question that you do not wish to an
swer, let me know and we'll move on to the next question. All your
answers will be kept confidential and will be seen only by the re
searchers directly involved with this project.

The first case was then read, followed by these instructions and
questions:
To remind you, a jury in an earlier trial found the defendant in this
case to be legally responsible for the plaintiff's injury or illness. Also
in that trial, the jury compensated the plaintiff for medical expenses
and lost wages. So leave those out of your calculation.

193. The introduction to the interview for lawyers and judges varied somewhat from the
introduction for jurors. The jurors' introduction had more information about the study
(since they had not received a letter about the study in advance of the phone call) and more
explanation of personal injury cases. The same instructions for determining an award were
read to all respondent groups within each state. The questions about the awards and the
injuries were asked of all participants in the same order. The particular socio-demographic
items varied with the respondent group; the questions asked of each group are included
here.
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New York:
You should focus only on compensating the plaintiff for the injury
and for any conscious pain and suffering that the plaintiff experienced
in the past, or will experience in the future with reasonable certainty.
In deciding the amount to be awarded for the injury and for conscious
pain and suffering, you may take into consideration any physical pain,
mental suffering, disability, disfigurement, or loss of the ability to en
joy life. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be
awarded. Any award that you make should be fair and reasonable in
light of the facts you have heard. Disregard any caps on pain and suf
fering in your state and give the award you think the injury should re
ceive without regard to any cap.

Illinois:
You should focus only on compensating the plaintiff for any physi
cal pain, mental suffering, disability, or disfigurement that the plaintiff
experienced in the past, or will experience in the future with reason
able certainty, as a result of the injury. In deciding the amount to be
awarded, you may consider the nature, extent, and duration of the in
jury. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be
awarded. Any award that you make should be fair and reasonable in
light of the facts you have heard. Disregard any caps on pain and suf
fering in your state and give the award you think the injury should re
ceive without regard to any cap.194
With all this in mind, how much money would you award to the
plaintiff?

[If the respondent answered zero]
Why do you think the plaintiff should receive no compensation?

Ifthe respondent said, in effect, the defendant was "not guilty" or
"not liable, " the interviewer replied: Let me remind you that a
jury in an earlier trial found the defendant in this case to be le
gally responsible for the plaintiff's injury or illness.
With this in mind, how much money would you award to the
plaintiff?
How much money do you think the average juror would award this
plaintiff?
Now I'm going to ask you five questions about your impressions of
the injuries the plaintiff suffered. For each question, I'd like you to
indicate your judgment on a five-point scale.

194. The last sentence in the instructions in both states was included for only the judges
and lawyers, who would tend to be aware of existing caps while the jurors would not.
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Considering both the amount of physical pain and how long it will
last, how much physical pain will this injury have caused the plain
tiff? From one, no pain at all, to five extreme pain?
Considering both the amount of mental suffering (that is, worry,
fear, depression, and so forth) and how long it will last, how much
mental suffering will this injury have caused the plaintiff? From
one, no mental suffering at all, to five, extreme mental suffering?
Considering both the amount of disability and how long it will last,
how much disability will this injury have caused the plaintiff?
From one, no disability at all, to five, extreme disability?
Considering both the amount of disfigurement and how long it will
last, how much disfigurement will this injury have caused the
plaintiff? From one, no disfigurement at all, to five, extreme dis
figurement?
Overall, considering all aspects, how severe is the injury to the
plaintiff? From one, not at all severe, to five, extremely severe?

The second case was then read, followed again by the award in
structions. The same award and injury questions as above were asked
for the second case.
After the awards and injury ratings were made for the second case,
the following socio-demographic information was obtained.
JURORS
In order to be sure that we have a fair representation of all kinds of
people, we'd like to ask you the following questions.
Do you personally know anyone who has had either of the condi
tions I have read to you about? IF YES: which one?
How would you describe where you live? Would you say it is: a
large city; the suburbs of a large city; a medium-sized city; or a small
town or rural area?
What is your age?
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
0 - 8th grade
9 - llth grade
high school graduate
some college
college graduate
post-college study or degree
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Please tell me which of the following ranges best describes your total annual household income.
less than $15,000

$15,000 - $30,000
$31,000 - $50,000
$51,000 - $75,000
over $75,000
Thank you for your participation in this interview. The answers
you have provided will assist the researchers in their study of legal de
cision making. Thank you very much for your time.

The following information also was recorded but was not asked of
the participants:
gender: male, female
state: Illinois, New York
from urban or rural county group: urban, rural

JUDGES
About what percentage of the cases that come before you are per
sonal injury cases?
Do the people who serve as jurors in your court come mostly:
from a large city; from the suburbs of a large city; from a medium
sized city; or from a small town or rural area?
Do you personally know anyone who has had either of the condi
tions I have read to you about, or have you heard a case involving ei
ther of these conditions? IF YES: which one?
For approximately how many years have you been hearing per
sonal injury cases as a judge?
That concludes the interview. Would you like to receive a sum
mary of the results of the study when it is completed?
Thank you for your participation in this interview. The answers
you have provided will assist the researchers in their study of damages
decision-making. Thank you very much for your time.

The following information also was recorded but was not asked of
the participants:
gender: male, female
state: Illinois, New York
from urban or rural county group: urban, rural
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LAWYERS
What percentage of your work involves representing clients in per
sonal injury cases?
In personal injury cases, do you represent: mostly plaintiffs,
mostly defendants, or both about equally?
In the personal injury cases that you have worked on, do the plain
tiffs come mostly: from a large city; from the suburbs of a large city;
from a medium-sized city; or from a small town or rural area?
Do you personally know anyone who has had either of the condi
tions I have read to you about, or have you been involved in a case in
which the plaintiff had either of these conditions? IF YES: which
one?
Have you served as an arbitrator in a personal injury case?
IF YES: Have you done that: rarely, occasionally, or often?
For approximately how many years have you been handling per
sonal injury cases?
That concludes the interview. Would you like to receive a sum
mary of the results of the study when it is completed?
Thank you for your participation in this interview. The answers
you have provided will assist the researchers in their study of damages
decision-making. Thank you very much for your time.

The following information also was recorded but was not asked of
the participants:
gender: male, female
state: Illinois, New York
from urban or rural county group: urban, rural
from plaintiff or defense group: plaintiff, defense
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APPENDIX C:

SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS CONCEPTS

Percentage of variance. The percentage of variance accounted for
tells us how well a group of variables included in a predictive model
accounts for what one seeks to predict, such as awards. Zero percent
of the variance in awards accounted for by injury ratings and demo
graphics would reflect a complete absence of predictive power; 100%
of the variance accounted for would reflect perfect predictive power.
Statistical significance of the predictor variables in the model. Only
those variables that have a statistically significant relationship to the
variable being predicted make a contribution to the predictive model.
Thus, variables that are not statistically significant are omitted from
the model.
Interactions. Sometimes the relationship of a predictor variable to
the variable being predicted is affected by another predictor variable.
In such circumstances one can add to the predictive power of a model
by including these statistically significant "interactions" between pre
dictor variables in the model. For example, we found that disability
interacted with state, such that disability had a greater impact on
awards for New York judges than for Illinois judges.
Direction of effect. The main effects (variables acting individually)
and interaction effects (variables acting jointly) can predict either in
creases or decreases in the variable being predicted.
Magnitude of effect. Some predictors are more powerful than oth
ers. The magnitude of an effect is typically reflected in a "regression
coefficient" (such as a Beta weight), and these are presented in a table
of the regression results. One of the most intuitively meaningful ways
to understand the magnitude of effect of a predictor is simply to com
pare it to other predictors.
Shared variance and unique variance. Sometimes different predic
tors are correlated with each other (that is, they "share variance"), so
that there is redundancy in their predictive power. The amount of
variance attributable to a given predictor and that predictor alone
("unique variance") is determined statistically by regression analysis
by removing the redundancy. In order to compare the extent to which
a given predictor's predictive power is a result of its shared versus
unique influence, we compare the magnitude of its uncontrolled effect
on the variable being predicted (given by a simple zero-order correla
tion, bivariate r, in which no other variables are controlled) with the
magnitude of its effect on the variable being predicted in the regres
sion model (given by Beta, in which the effect of other variables has
been removed).
The reader who wishes to understand these statistical techniques
even more deeply might consult one of the many textbooks on the
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topic, or, for a treatment designed for judges and lawyers, read Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Guide to Multiple Regression, § 4, in MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks &
Joseph Sanders eds., 1997).

